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Abstract 
Using a general equilibrium approach, I develop a two-period model that pro-
vides microeconomic foundations for the relationsh ip among fiscal policies, 
optimal growth, and elections under two different economic systems: a free 
economy and a democratic planned economy. 
In a free economy (Chapter 2), I assume the government indirect ly con-
trols the economy by selecting a fiscal policy, and a firm chooses the growth 
path. First, I show that fiscal policy determines the endogenous growth of 
the economy, and fiscal policy is determined by the distribution of income. 
Second, ceteris paribus, the wealthier are more likely to oppose a larger gov-
ernment and a redistribution-oriented fiscal policy. T hird, I show that binary 
voting procedures always generate the median-income consumer as the ma-
jority winner. Fourth. when a private good utility has a constant elasticity of 
marginal utility of income. then (a) fiscal policy and income distribution have 
no effects on economic growth; (b) among different distributions of income, 
the higher the profit share of the decisive consumer (i.e., median-income con-
sumer), the lower the tax rate; (c) under certain conditions, the inverted-U 
curve relationship between economic development and income inequality (the 
VI 
Kuznets Curve) does not exist . 
In a democratic planned economy (Chapter 3), I assume the government 
controls the economy by setting wage rates, prices and the growth rate of the 
economy. First, I show that there exist voting equilibria which are sensit ive 
to agenda setting in most cases. Second, I show that with Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, decentralization of wage decisions in a democratic 
planned economy can guarantee a unique political-economic equilibrium and 
a growth path that is middle-class-oriented. Third, when utility satisfies 
certain conditions, a democratic planned economy can experience the same 
growth path and income-distributional neutrality on growth as that of a free 
economy. 
Cross-country and cross-time empirical evidence (Chapter 4) are provided 
to test theoretical predictions and raise questions for future theoretical ex-
planation. In particular, I find that the growth rate of the population and 
the ratio of gross private investment to GDP have significantly negative and 
positive effects on economic growt h, respectively. 
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A comprehensive and systematic understanding of economic growth requires 
the exploration of both macroeconomic policy and elections simultaneously. 
This dissertation studies the interrelationship among fiscal policies, optimal 
growth and political elections under two different economic systems: a free 
economy and a democratic planned economy. The following standard ques-
tions of neoclassical growth models are posed, examined and answered in the 
dissertation. 
For free economies, is it possible to explain observed differences in long-
run growth rates without considering exogenous changes in technology or 
population? Why don't we observe a monotonic relation between income tax 
rates and economic growth rates as predicted by neoclassical models? Does 
a political-economic equilibrium exist when candidates compete for office by 
2 
selecting different fiscal policies? Can the median-income consumer prevail 
in any binary procedure under the majority rule? What is the predicted 
relationship of wealth to preferences on tax rates and the size of public good 
sector? When can we predict fiscal neutrality in economic growth? Does the 
inverted-U curve relationship between economic development and income 
inequality (the Kuznets curve) always exist with different utility functions? 
In Chapter 3, I study democratic planned economies. Does a political-
economic equilibrium exist in a democratic planned economy? What is the 
effect of decentralizing economic decision-making on electoral outcomes? Can 
different economic systems experience the same growth path given the same 
initial economic conditions? 
In addition to addressing the above theoretical questions, I present ex-
ploratory empirical evidence bearing on the following questions, which are 
derived from both existing neoclassical growth theory and my theoretical 
discussions. Do the growth rates across countries converge to steady state? 
Are the growth rates of population and GDP per capita positiYely or neg-
atively related? What are the effects of gross private investment. public 
sector investment, and human capital on economic growth? Does govern-
ment spending have a negative effect on economic growth? How does income 
inequality affect economic growth? 
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1.2 Main Features 
This dissertation differs from most of the current literature in the following 
important ways. First, I incorporate fiscal policies, optimal growth and elec-
tions together in a model and am able to systematically study and character-
ize the political-economic equilibrium. 1 Second, I study two-sector (private 
good and public good) models2 where government uses its tax revenue to 
provide public goods and make private good transfers. Third, a firm (or the 
economy as a whole) owned by consumers in fixed shares is introduced to 
decide capital accumulation. This setting enables me to capture the reality 
that government only indirectly controls the economy by selecting an income 
tax rate, while at the same time it avoids treating consumers identically 
as some neoclassical growth models do. Fourth, instead of using Phillips 
curve or voter myopia, exogenous welfare functions, or cost functions of in-
1Chapter 2 of my dissertation is similar to Perotti (1990) in the sense that both papers 
deal with redistribution, political decisions and economic growth. However, there are some 
fundamental differences between these two papers: first, Perotti assumes convex costs 
in collecting taxes and ta...x revenue is only used in redistribution. I assume no costs in 
collecting tax and tax revenue can be used in public good production as well as private good 
transfers (a kind of redistribution). Second, my model deals with the two-sector economy 
(i.e., private good and public good) instead of the one-sector economy. Third, Perotti 
assumes linear utility and no explicit production function, while I deal with generally 
well-defined utility functions and production functions. Finally, some assumptions are 
made about the distribution of pre-tax incomes in Perotti's paper, for example, there are 
three groups characterized by different pre-tax incomes, the median voter is in the middle 
class and the median is initially below the mean, while the distribution of pre-tax income 
in this paper can be arbitrary. 
2The two sectors in my context are different from those in the current literature. The 
two sectors in King and Rebelo (1990) refer to consumption/physical investment and 
human capital investment. The two sectors in Rebelo (1991) include capital sector and 
consumption sector. Barro (1990) does employ a similar two-sector model as ours, however 
the utility function in his model is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. 
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flation and/or unemployment for government, I assume that consumers (the 
firm) maximize their (its) own utilities (profit) subject to technological and 
budget constraints. The general equilibrium approach provides the microe-
conomic foundation for this political-economic electoral model as well as the 
systematic solution. Fifth, I look into the relationships among fiscal poli-
cies, economic growth, and elections in a democratic planned economy and 
compare them with the relationships that exist in a free economy. Finally, 
in addition to some conventional hypotheses widely studied across countries, 
I test the hypotheses concerning the effects of public sector investment and 
income inequality on economic growth. 
1.3 Organization 
My thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2, which studies fiscal policies, 
optimal growth, and elections in a free economy, is divided into the following 
sections: a review of literature , model , main conclusions, constant elasticity 
of marginal utility of income, and summary. I study fiscal policies, optimal 
growth, and elections in a democratic planned economy in Chapter 3. This 
Chapter includes three sections: model, main conclusions, and summary and 
system comparison. An empirical study of economic growth is offered in 
Chapter 4, which consists of five sections: introduction, empirical design, 
variables and hypotheses, results, summary and data appendix. I conclude 
in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
Fiscal Policies, Optimal 
Growth, and Elections in a 
Free Economy 
2.1 A Review of the Literature 
There are four strands of literature relevant to this chapter. First , researchers 
have constructed a class of endogenous growth models (Solow (1956), Cass 
(1965), Koopmans (1965), and Uzawa (1965)). These models feature a closed 
economy with competitive markets , identical rational individuals, and a pro-
duction technology exhibiting diminishing returns to capital and labor sepa-
rately and constant returns to both inputs jointly. They have the following 
properties: (i) the existence of a constant asymptotic growth rate; and (ii) the 
coincidence of competitive and optimal allocations in the absence of public 
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interventions. As King and Rebelo {1990) put it, the crucial attribute of this 
class of models is that there is a "core" of capital goods that can be produced 
without the direct or indirect contribution of nonreproducible factors.1 
Second, the problem of economic growth and elections has been explored. 
This line of li terature implicitly assumes that a planner can affect the econ-
omy by directly choosing capital and/or consumption paths. Beck (1978) 
politicizes a continuous time, one-sector model of optimal economic growth, 
where individuals vary only in their rates of time preference. He shows that 
among a set of optimal plans, the consumption path that is optimal for the 
voter with the median discount rate is a majority rule core (a political equi-
librium). Boylan, Ledyard and McKelvey (1991) study Beck's model in a 
discrete time setting and prove that there is no majority rule core if nonopti-
mal plans are feasible. Furthermore, they show that if it is possible for candi-
dates to commit to multi-period plans in a credible fashion, then in general, 
there will not be a majority rule core. On the other hand, if commitment 
is impossible, there is a subgame perfect, stationary, symmetric equilibrium 
to the two-candidate competition game that supports the consumption path 
that is optimal for the median voter. 
The third focus in the literature is the problem of public policy and 
elections, i.e., the so-called ''political business cycle". Underlying the cycle in 
the original model of Nordhaus (1975) is a Keynesian Phillips curve and voter 
myopia. MacRae (1977) confirms that if the electorate is myopic, politicians 
will inflate the economy during election years in order to exploit a Phillips 
1 For a recent survey of this line of literature, see Romer (1989). 
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curve tradeoff that is more favorable in the short run than in the long run. 
However, if the voter is rational and votes strategically, vote-loss-minimizing 
behavior will lead to a long-run inflation-unemployment combination that is 
a social optimum. Subsequent works study political business cycles without 
relying on voter myopia. For example, a political budget cycle arises in Rogoff 
(1990) (see also Rogoff and Sibert (1988)) due to temporary information 
asymmetries about the incumbent leader's "competence'' in administering 
the public goods production process even if both voters and politicians are 
rational, utility-maximizing players. By assuming that parties have different 
exogenous objectives concerning inflation and unemployment, and that voters 
are rational and forward-looking, Alesina (1987) is able to generate political 
business cycles due to the fact that the election provides a random shock (see 
also Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1991)) .2 
The fourth emphasis has been on the problem of public policy and eco-
nomic growth. Relying largely on Cobb-Douglas production technology, this 
strand of literature studies the relationship between public policies and long-
term economic growth for a representative consumer without relying on ex-
ogenous changes in technology or population. For example, public policy 
can affect growth rates via the incentives that individuals have to accumu-
late capital in both its physical and human forms (King and Rebelo (1990)), 
or via the role of public services as an input to private production and con-
sumption (Barro (1990)). By using the standard convex technology, Jones 
and Manuelli ( 1990) are able to show that the long-run growth rate in per 
2 For a review of this strand of literature, see Alesina (1988). 
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capita consumption depends on the parameters describing tastes, technol-
ogy, and policies. National growth rates of consumption and output need 
not converge in a free-trade equilibrium with taxation. 
2.2 Model 
2.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
Consider a free economy with a government, a firm3 and N consumers. There 
are two kinds of output, namely a private good xl and a public good x2, and 
two kinds of input, namely capital I< and labor Lin the economy. Like Stokey, 
Lucas and Prescott (1989), I assume pt to be the price of a unit of output 
X 1 delivered in period t, and Wt to be the real wage rate in period t. Each 
consumer i(i= 1, 2, .. . . N) shares a fixed part of the firm's profit, Oi E [0, 1] 
and L~I ei = 1. I assume the distribution of e is common knowledge. 
I assume there is an election using some binary procedure under majority 
rule. Any consumer can be a candidate4 and compete with other candidate 
by selecting a fiscal policy in terms of an income tax rate, T, and/or a weight 
of the public sector, ¢. Eventually, using a voting procedure to be specified, 
one of the consumers is elected and implements the fiscal policy that he 
3 The firm can be thought as an economy. I do not assume multiple firms for simplicity 
because it is very complicated to compare different profit shares among consumers when 
there are multiple firms with or without different sizes and products. 
4 1 assume no cost for entry because to add a fixed cost does not change my results. 
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or she prefers. 
Assume that each consumer i(i= 1, 2, ... , N) lives two periods 5 and has 
a discount factor6 j3 E [0, 1]. In each period i has one unit of time to spend 
and has a utility function u(x!u x~), where x~1 and x~ are i' s consumption 
levels of the private good xl and the public good x2 in period t respectively. 
Assumption 1: u : R~ ---+ R~ is monotonically increa5ing, twice con-
tinuously differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and additively separable, and 
satisfies the following Inada conditions: 
For simplicity, I henceforth let u(x~1 , x~) =: x(x~1 ) + e(x~). 
Assume that the firm has a production function of the private good given 
as j(I{t , V) , where J(t and V are the capital input and the labor input in 
period t, respectively. 
Assumption 2: f : R~ ---+ R~ is monotonically increasing, twice con-
tinuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave, and satisfies f(O, L) = 0 
5It makes no difference for all of my conclusions to assume that each consumer i lives 
any finite N periods. I will briefly discuss generalization of our conclusion to N-period 
later. 
6 In fact, our results hold when consumers do not have the same discount factors. How-
ever, then, I must assume that all profit shares and discount rates are common knowledge. 
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(V L) and the following Inada conditions: 
lim of(I<t, V) = lim of(Kt, V) = +oo and 
K1 !0 ()J(t L'!O o£t 
lim of(Kt,Lt) = lim of(I<t,V) = 0. 
Ktf+oo ()J(t £lf+oo o£t 
In addition, throughout the paper, I also assume: (1) all consumers have 
the same utility functions; 7 (2) goods will not be wasted; (3) the production 
technology of the public good is simply one unit of the private good to one 
unit of the public good. 
2 .2.2 Notation and Timing of the Model 
N is the number of consumers; and t, is a t ime index, scored 0 or 1; Ti is the 
tax rate proposed by candidate j (j = 1, 2, . . . , N); </>is the proportion of tax 
revenue used in the production of the public good; (1 - </>) is the proportion 
of tax revenue used in the private good transfer; the price of X 1 in period 0 is 
taken as a numerare, i.e., P0 = 1; P 1 = Pis the price of X 1 in period 1; W is 
the real wage rate; y is the amount of X 1 sold by the firm ; K is the aggregate 
capi tal input; L is the aggregate labor input; 1r0 = y0 - W 0 L0 is the profit of 
period 0; 1r1 = P(y1 - W 1 £1) is the profit of period 1; (}i is the fixed share 
of the profit to consumer i; li is the amount of labor supplied by consumer i; 
f3 is the discount rate for each consumer; Ci is the pre-transfer consumption 
7 W hen consumers may have different utility functions, in order to derive the same 
results, I need to assume all utility functions are common knowledge. 
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level of X 1 by consumer i; x11 is the total consumption level of X 1 (including 
transfer from government) by consumer i; x2 is the consumption level of the 
public good by each consumer; and Ui is the sum of discounted utility by 
consumer t . i.e. , ui = L::=o.Btu(x~l ,x~) where 
x?1 c? + (
1 
-N<P )T [£:(W0 l? + Bi1r0 )] 
1=1 
x:1 cJ + (1 -N¢>)T [t(W 1lf + Bi ~ )] 
t= l 
N 
x~ ¢>T["l:)W0 l? + B11r0 )] 
i=l 
Each term in brackets is the sum of real wage and profit share across all 
consumers, i.e. , the real gross income, y, in a period. That is , y = l::~1 (Wl;+ 
Bi1r) . 
Following Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), I do not consider leisure in 
the utility function, and assume candidates as well as consumers maximize 
their own utilities subject to budget constraints, and the firm maximizes 
its profit subject to the technical constraint . I constrain the government to 
run a balanced budget each period and assume that the fiscal policy has 
two purposes: redistribution of the private good and provision of the public 
good. In other words, the tax revenue can be used either in the transfer of 
the private good for the purpose of redistribution8 and/or the production of 
8 AI though I do not explicitly discuss progressive income taxation in the paper, this 
setting resembles a kind of progressive ta..xation when T and ¢; are high, and allows far 
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the public good. The model and its timing9 are given below (see Figure 2.1): 




Consumer 1: Votes for v<k > goes elected 
TJ T~c (I•I, ... ,N) argmax U t o next lmplems 





Figure 2.1 : Timing for a Free Economy 
In stage 0, given the set of consumers and a fixed binary voting proce-
dure, each consumer decides whether he or she will be a candidate. If he or 
she decides not to be a candidate, his or her opponent automatically wins the 
binary competition and goes to the next branch of the voting tree. Figure 
2.2 gives a voting t ree with 4 consumers and a voting procedure in the order 
of 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
In stage 1, In each branch of the voting t ree, a candidate J (j 
more flexibility in the ta.x structure. 
9The timing of voting on aJ is similar. 
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1, 2, ... , N) proposes a tax rate T1 in order to maximize his or her utility 
which is given in stage 2.2. 
In stage 2.1,10 for any given pt and W 1(t = 0, 1), the firm chooses V 
and J<1+1 (t = 0, 1) to maximize the sum of periodic profits, i.e., 
1 
max1r max L p t[yt - wt Lt] 
t=O 
max[(y0 - W 0 L0 ) + P(y 1 - ltf/ 1 L1 )] (2.1) 
s.t . y t < J(I<', Lt) + (1 _ b)I<t _ f{ t+t (2.2) 
J(l > 0, t = 0, 1, given [(0 = R. 
Where 8 is the depreciation rate of the capi tal. 
In stage 2.2 , for any given </>, T, Oi, pt, wt and 1rt(t = 0, 1), consumer 
i(i = 1, 2, .. . , N) chooses cl, l~ to 
1 
max ui = max 2:: f3tu.( x~1 , x~) (2.3) 
t=O 
1 
{ (1- </>)T } = max~ /31u. c~ + N yt, <f>Ty1 
10The following substages 2.1 , 2.2 and 2.3 take place at the same time. 
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1 1 
s.t. L Pte~ ~ :l:(l - T)[P1W 1l: + 0i11'1] (2.4) 
t=O t=O 
N 
o ~ ~~ ~ 1, c~ ~ o, o ~ ei ~ 1, L: ei = 1, and t = o, 1. (2.5) 
i =I 
In stage 2.3, all markets clear, i.e., I::~1 l~ = V and 'L:~ 1 c! = (1-T )y1• 
Combining equations (2. 1) to (2.5) and market-clearing equat ions together , 
each consumer can solve for a competitive equilibrium: (1( 1 r' (W0r' 
(W 1r, P e,(z?r, (lJ)e, (c?r and (ctr Vi= 1,2, ... ,N. 
In stage 3 , in each binary competition (i.e., a branch of the binary tree) , 
each consumer i(i = 1, 2, ... , N) votes for 
1 
j = argmax :l:u(x~1 e(Tj),x~e(Tj)), 
1=0 
and if indifferent, then splits the vote. 
In stage 4 , the candidate with the larger number of votes in each binary 
competition is elected, and implements a tax policy. 
15 
Figure 2.2: A Fixed Binary Procedure When N = 4. 
R emark: First, if there is no campaign cost, it is clear that each con-
sumer is a potential candidate; however, if there is a positive campaign cost, 
then only those consumers with expected benefits higher than costs will run 
a campaign. Second, although I assume there is a fixed binary voting proce-
dure in stage 0, my results hold for any binary voting procedure as we will 
see later. Third. candidates' promises are not necessarily binding. They can 
do whatever they like if they win office. 
Although there are some similarities between the model of Stokey-Lucas 
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(1989) and mine, such as a finite time horizon and disutility of labor, there 
are some fundamental differences between these two models: first , I include a 
public good. Second, the firm owns capital, so capital has only implicit cost, 
and there is no capital market here. Furthermore because of the ownership of 
capital, the firm makes profits that are proportionally shared by consumers. 
Third, by introducing an income tax rate, T , and a weight of the public sector , 
</>, I am able to study the relationship between the income distribution and 
voting behavior on fiscal policy. 
2.2.3 D efinit ions 
First, I define two crucial concepts: a competitive equilibrium and a political-
economic equilibrium. 
D efinition 1: Given T and</>, a competitive equilibrium in a free economy 
is a set of prices and wages {(Pt , wt)}~=o' an allocation {(Lt, J( t+I)}:=o for 
the firm , and an allocation { ( cL if)} :=o for consumer i ( i = 1, 2, ... , N), s. t., 
a. {(Lt , J<t+I)}:=o solves (2.1 ) and (2.2) at the stated prices; 
b. { ( cL l~)} :=o solves (2.3) to (2.5) at the stated prices; 
c. all markets clear, i.e., E~1 Z! = V and E~1 c~ = ( 1 - T)yt , for all 
t = 0, 1. 
Definition 2: A political-economic equilibrium11 in a free economy is a 
set containing a consumer (or consumers) {j}j=I ,2, ... ,N ' an income tax rate 
11 A political-economic equilibrium can be similarly defined by substituting T with <P 
when consumers vote on </J, or adding <P to T when consumers vote on T and </J. 
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{T;} (or a set ofT;) , and a competitive equilibrium corresponding to Tj, 
denoted by c.e.(Tj), such that {j, T;, c.e.(Ti)} solves the model (stages 1 to 
4) in 2.2.2. 
In addition, I present the following definitions of the Bowen-Lindahl-
Samuelson condition, and fiscal and distributional neutrality: 12 
D fi •t• 3· A 11 · ( o o o. 1 1 1) fi e n1 w n . n a ocatwn xi1 , .. . , xiN' x 2 , xi1, . .. , xiN• x 2 satis es 
the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition if, for each period, the sum over 
all consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good 
and the private good is equal to the marginal rate of transformation in pro-
duction between these two good, i.e., there is (T, ¢>) such that13 
where superscripts are time index and subscripts denote partial derivatives 
with respect to each argument. 
D efinit ion 4: A j1·ee economy is fiscally and dist1·ibutionally neutml if 
all macroeconomic variables 1<1 , W 0 , W 1 and P are independent of T , ¢> and 
e. 
12The definition of fiscal neutrality here differs from ta.x neutralities in Bradford (1980) 
and Harberger (1980). Bradford defines tax neutrality of investment subsidy as the case 
when income tax system influences investment only via its effect on savings not via the 
composition of the capital stock. Ta.x neutrality in Harberger (1980) requires some social 
rate of return, such that all independent investment projects meeting the rate will tend to 
be privately accepted, while no project failing to meet that rate will be privately accepted. 
13Because of the assumption that each one unit of the private good can produce one 
unit of the public good, the marginal rate of transformation in production is one. 
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2.3 Main Conclusions 
2.3.1 Existence of A Competitive Equilibrium 
First, I derive the first order conditions for the firm and consumers. For 
a typical consumer, it is obvious that he or she supplies all of the available 
factor L, because L causes no disutility to him, i.e., l? = lJ = 1, L0 = L1 = N. 
It is clear that /(2 = 0 because period 2 is the end of the world. Since 
limK-o f 1(K1 . L) = +oo, the nonnegativity constraint on /( 1 in (2.2) is never 
binding, i.e., J(l > 0. Now let 
F(Kt) = J(I<t, N) + (1 - S)Kt, t = 0, 1. 
Because of the assumption that goods wi ll not be wasted, (2.2) becomes 
y° F(K)- /(1 and 
yt F(I<t ). 
Thus I have shown that L0 , L1 and /( 1 > 0. By Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (see 
Dixi t (1990)), the first order conditions for the firm are: 
h(R,N) wo (2.6) 
/2(/< 1 , N) W' (2.7) 
p 1 (2.8) 
F' (Kt )" 
x(x~1 ) + ~(x~). Then the first order conditions for a 
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consumer i (Vi= 1, 2, ... , N) are: 
x' { c? + (1 ~<P)T [F(J()- Je]} 
,Bx'[cJ + (1 -N</>)T F(J<I)] 
1 
L (l- T)[PtWt + Oi7rt] 
t=O 
1 
L (l - T)[P1yt + pt~r t(1 - OiN)] 
t=O 
The conditions for market clearing are: 
< ).i , 
< >.iP, 
1 
> L:Ptc~ ,, 
t=O 
1 
> L:Ptc~ ,, 
t=O 
(1 - T)y0 and 
i =1 
(1- T)y1 . 
c~ > 0 ' - (2.9) 
c1 > 0 '- (2.10) 
).i ~0 I.e. , (2.11) 
).. 
1 ~ 0. 
(2.12) 
(2 .13) 
Proposition 1: Given T and ¢, there exists a competitive equi-
librium. 
Proof: Since a consumer cannot do anything about the public good for 
given T and </> and his or her utility is separable in time, the current prob-
lem is equivalent to a neoclassical private ownership production economy 
with one producer, N consumers and two goods, i.e., a present private good 
and a future private good. Because of the assumptions I make about utility 
functions and the production function (monotonically increasing, twice con-
tinuously differentiable, and stri ctly quasiconcave), it is easy to verify that 
all Arrow-Debreu conditions are satisfied, thus there exists a competitive 
equilibrium (see Debreu (1959), Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989)). 
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Q.E.D. 
Remark: Proposition 1 and the following results can be generalized to 
the case of any finite N-period game. Roughly speaking, given T and </J, 
the problem given in (2.1) to (2.5) and market clearing conditions for any 
finite periods t is equivalent to a neoclassical private ownership production 
economy with one producer, N consumers and t goods (private good in each 
period corresponds to a good). It can be shown by the Arrow-Debreu Theo-
rem that there is a competitive equilibrium. 
Proposition 2: Given the distribution of(), the wealthier a con-
sumer i(i = 1, 2, ... , N) is, the more private good he or she consumes, 
and the better off he or she is.14 




14Throughout most parts of the paper, I take the distribution of 0 as given. So for 
any given distribution of 0, T and 4> are endogenously determined, so is the political-
economic equilibrium. Therefore, in propositions 2, 3 and 4, which study the relation 
between wealthiness and the attitude towards fiscal policies, all derivatives with respect 
to 0 or income refer to the switch of consumers with different profit shares in the same 
distribution of 0 rather than changing of the distributio11. In 4.3, I study the relationship 
between ta.."'< rate and income distribution when the elasticity of marginal utility of income 
is constant. 
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Substituting (2.14) and (2.15) into (2.16), we have 
( ) o 1 { 1 P
2 
} a >.i 1 - r ( 1r + 1r ) = --;; + -!3 , ~e .. 
Xo Xt u , 
Recalling x~, x~ < 0 (Assumption 1), we get W, < 0. Substituting 
~ < 0 into (2.14) and (2.15) yields~~ ~ > 0 and 
where x~ and x~ are the first derivatives of utility at t = 0 and t = 1 with 
respect to X 1 respectively. Q.E.D. 
2.3.2 Voting on the Tax Rate 
Now in order to derive proposition 3 concerning the relationship between 
wealthiness and attitude towards the tax rate (or the size of government), I 
need the following condition: 
Condition a: Rr(x) = (-(;~~£!t) ~ 1 'i/x E R, i.e., a utility function 
for the private good has an elasticity of marginal utility of income 
(EMUI) not greater than one. 15 
15This condition is generally true for a developed economy with a relatively equal dis-
tribution of income, in which marginal utilities will not respond to changes in income 
dramatically, since consumers are relatively rich and the marginal utility is decreasing. 
However this condition may not hold for an undeveloped economy. 
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Proposition 3: If condition a is satisfied, then given </> and the 
distribution of B, wealthier consumers are more likely to oppose a 
larger government, i.e ., 
Proof: Let I; = LH 5(2.11) to be i 1 s income. If one consumer's income 
differs from the income of other consumers, it only differs on 0;. There is a 
positive relation between I; and () i· Hence I need to prove a(a~f.aT) < 0. 
Recalling u(x~1 , x~) = x(x!1 , x~) + ~(x~) and taki ng t he derivative with 
respect to T in (2.3), we have 
au 
aT { ~; + (
1 ~ </>) [F(K) - I<1] } X~+ </> [F(K) - K1]~~ + 
+ (3 { ~; + (1 ~ </>) F(I<1) } X~+ f3</>F(K 1 )~~ . (2.17) 
Now taking the derivative with respect toT in (2.11 ) yields, 
Using (2.9), (2.10) and (2.18), (2.17) can be rewritten as 
au 
aT -A; I ) Ptwt + B;7rt] + (1 ~ </>) [F(k)- I<I]x~ + t=O 
</>[F(K)- K1 ]e~ + (3(1 ~ ¢;) F(I< 1 )X~ + f3</JF(I< 1 )~~· 
(2.18) 
Recalling I; = L::=0 (1 - T)[Ptwt + Bi1rt] and taking the derivative with 
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respect to 1; in the above equation gives 
!_(au ) _ -~ _ ~ 8>..; (1- </>) [ 0 8c? II P 1 8cJ Ill 
81; 8T - 1 - T 1 - T 81; + N y 81; Xo + y 81; X1 . 
8c0 ocl . 
Similarly as in Proposition 2, we have af:, it > 0. Usmg the above 
inequalities, A;= ~~ and R..(x) :::; 1 yields 
8Uj81;[ _D(1·)] (1-</>)[ 0 8c? 11 p 1 8cJ 11] 0 1- T 1 .l Lr ' + N y 81; Xo + y 81; XI < . 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3 claims that when the marginal utility of income for the 
private good is not too elastic/6 i.e. , not too sensit ive to a change in income, 
then given the distribution of income and the percentage of tax revenue 
used in public good production , the poor would like an expansionary fiscal 
policy (i .e., a fiscal policy with the higher tax rate) or a larger government. 
Some direct evidence supports the negative relationship between wealthiness 
and attitude towards the size of government. For example, Sears and Citrin 
(1982) study the California tax revolt of 1978 and find that income is linearly 
related to support for the tax revolt (Tables 5.1 and 5.3, Sears and Citrin 
(1982)). 
Second, it is a "stylized fact" that one of the obvious differences between 
the major American political parties is found in the social and economic 
status of their supporters. Republicans are likely to have higher incomes 
16 At this point, it is not clear how far I can weaken condition a in order to derive 
Proposition 3. However, an example is provided at the end of Subsection 2.4.4 to show 
that when condition a is violated, counter-intuitive results may follow. 
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than Democrats. Therefore the attitudes about the size of government of the 
Democratic and Republican parties to some extent reflect the attitudes of the 
poor and the rich respectively. Tufte points out that in 1976, the Republican 
platforms are significantly more concerned of federal spending (22 times vs. 3 
times), size and cost of government (11 vs. 2), taxes ( 45 vs . 37), and private 
sector (10 vs. 3) than the Democratic platforms (Table 4-1, Tufte (1978)). 
This conclusion holds for other countries as well. As we see that parties 
of the Left have traditionally favored a more powerful central government 
and an expansion of the public economy than parties of the Right. From 
1945 to 1969, each additional decade of left-wing government control means 
an additional 10 percentage point increase in government receipts (Figures 
4-4 and 4-5, Tufte (1978)). Kiewiet finds that during 1960-1980, compared 
to the Republicans , the Democrats were more likely to believe that new or 
large federal programs were needed; while they were less likely to believe 
that too much government spending was the nation 's worst problem (Figure 
6.2, Kiewiet (1983)). Browning states that during 1947-1982, Democratic 
presidential policy initiatives outnumber the Republican initiatives by a fac-
tor of 4 and almost twice as many programs were initiated during periods 
of Democratic control of both the Presidency and Congress than during all 
other three combinations of Presidencies and Congress (Table 5-4, Browning 
(1986)). Similarly, Democratic Presidents and Congresses are far more likely 
to initiate large programs than Republican Presidents and Congresses (Table 
5-5, Browning (1986)). 
Lemma 1: Given <1> and the distribution of Oi, for any voter 
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(i = 1, ... , N), 8;.(~~) < 0. 
Proof: Taking the derivative with respect to T in (2.18) yields 
2:~::;;0 pt~i~ = 0. Taking the derivative with respect toT in (2.17) gives 
{ ~; + (1 ~ ,P) [F(k) - K 1] r x; + { ,P[F(k) - K' ] }' {; 
+ {3[~~ + {1 ~ <P) F(I(t)]
2
x~ + f3[<PF(I<t)]2~~~ 
82c9 1 82c~ 1 
+ 8T;xo + 8T;f3xt 
{ ~':}. + (1 ~ <P\F(k)- K1] r x; + { ,P[F(k)- K'J}' {~ 
+ {3[ ~~ + (1 ~ <P) F(I(t)]2 X~+ f3[</JF(I(l)]2~~~ 
, 82 c9 82c~ 
+ Xo [ 8T; + p 8T;] < 0. 
I 
The second equality used ~ = P, which was derived from (2.9) and (2.10),17 
Xo 
and the last inequality used 2::::;;0 P 1 :iJ = 0, and the assumption that all 
second derivatives are negative. Q.E.D. 
~~ is shown in a (T, ~~) space in Figure 2.3 by Proposition 3 and Lemma 
1. I am now able to give the main conclusion of this chapter. The following 
theorem provides us with the conditions and outcome of a political-economic 
equilibrium for voting over tax rates in a free economy. 




F1gure 2.3: Tax Rates and Marg1na1 Ut11tt1es or Tax 
Theorem 1: (1) Given ¢ and the distribution of Oi, when condi-
tion a is satisfied, the median-income voter, m, will prevail in elec-
tions with any binary procedure under majority rule; the political-
economic equilibrium is {m, T~, c.e.(T!)} , where 
T~ = arg m ax {U~(l), U~(T· )} , U~( l ) and U~(T• ) are utilities for voter 
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m in competitive equilibrium when T = 1 and T = T• respectively, 
and T* satisfies aum II = 0. 
8T T=T• 
Proof: (1) Step 1 , for any voter i(i = 1, ... , N), T{ is either on the 
boundary, i.e. , 1, 18 or an interior point T* which satisfies the first order 
condition: au-11 0 W T=T• = . 
Step 2, if 8; > 8i, Vi,j = (1, ... , N), then Tt :S rr 
(i) If TJ = 1, it is obvious. 
(ii) If Tt = 1, then according to step 1, it must be the case that ~ > 
0, VT E [0, 1). By Proposition 3, we have ~ > 0, VT E [0, 1). Therefore 
TJ = 1. 
(iii) If T{, Tf < 1. Suppose not, T{ ~ Tf, then usmg Lemma 1 and 
Proposition 3 in sequence, we have 0 = au II < au II < au II - 0 







which is a contradiction. 
Step 3 , Step 2 implies that all individual preferences belong to the class of 
"intermediate preferences" studied by Grandmont (1978). This class has the 
following useful property: individual preferences are indexed by the parame-
ter 8; and the distribution of preferences within the group is fully summarized 
by the distribution of 8;. As shown by Grandmont (1978), since 8; is a scaler, 
preferences are single peaked. Clearly, provided that all tax policy options 
are compared pairwise, the most preferred tax policy of the median voter is 
a majority alternative; then according to McKelvey and Niemi (1978), for 
187'{ = 0 is impossible because of the lnada condition: 
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general binary procedures, multistage sophistication will a~sure the adoption 
of that alternative. 
Step 4, the political-economic equilibrium can be computed by solving 
the problem (2.6) to (2 .13), with re maximizing the utility of the median 
voter. Q .E .D . 
2.3.3 Voting on the Weight of the Public Sector 
The timing of the model and definitions of a competitive equilibrium and a 
political-economic equilibrium are the same as those in 2.2 and 2.3 except 
now consumers vote on </> instead of voting on T . T he following proposition, 
which is more robust than Proposition 3 in the sense that it can be derived 
without condition a, studies a case when government controls </>and takes T 
as g1ven. 
Proposition 4: Given the tax rate T and the distribution 
of income, wealthier consumers are more likely to oppose a 
redistribution-oriented fiscal policy, i.e., 
In other words, wealthier consumers would like government to 
spend more tax revenue on the production of the public good . 
Proof: For any given T E [0, 1], ~~ = L::=o f3tT[F(I(t)- J(t+l](~; - ~x~ . ) 
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Using Assumption 1 and Proposition 2, we have 
Q.E.D . 
Proposition 4 states that given the distribution of income and the tax 
rate, wealthier consumers are more likely to oppose a redistribution-oriented 
fiscal policy. Some empirical studies confirm this result. Tufte claims that in 
1976, compared to the Republican platforms, the Democratic platforms are 
much more concerned about the distributional issues, such as inequality (30 
times vs. 15 times), opportunity {24 vs. 7), and poverty (23 vs. 3) (Table 
4-1, Tufte (1978)). He also shows a positive relationship between the high 
degree of income equalization (measured by the difference between pre-tax 
and post-tax income for the top 20 percent of households) and the extent 
of left-wing control of the executive branch in ten industrialized count ries 
(Figure 4-3, Tufte (1978)). 
Theorem 2: Given T and the distribution of ()i, the median-
income voter will beat anyone else in elections with any binary 
procedure under majority rule; the political-economic equilibrium 
is {m , ¢>~,c.e.{</>~)}, where </>e = argmax { U~(l),U~{</>- )}, U~{l ) and 
U~ ( <f>•) are utilities for the median voter m in competitive equi-
librium when </> = 1 and 4> = 4>· respectively, and <f>• satisfies 
8%; 11<1>=<1>· = 0. 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 
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2.3.4 Voting on the Tax Rate and t he W e ight of Pub-
lic Sector 
Now consider the case when candidates are allowed to choose ¢>as well as T. 
Although median-voter-like results follow for both one-dimensional voting 
cases (i.e., voting on T and ¢> respectively), this may not hold when the 
voting on T and ¢>is simultaneous and voters are sophisticated. For example, 
suppose there are three consumers L, M and S in a free economy with fh > 
eM > Os. Then by Theorem 1, given ¢>, TL < TM < Ts; and by Theorem 2, 
given T , 1 -¢>L < 1 -¢>M < 1 -¢>s. Suppose the ideal points for voters L, M 
and S look like those in Figure 4, then L and S would like to select a point 
in the shadow area, say N, which is preferred over M for both of them. 
What will happen if we focus on sequential voting on T and ¢> (similarly 
for voting on ¢> and T)? Suppose the t iming and definitions of competitive 
equilibrium and political-economic equilibrium are similar to those in Chap-
ter 2 except now after selecting a majority winner through a binary process in 
dimension T, consumers vote on ¢>and select a majority winner in dimension 
¢>. The rule of the game is as follows: only the majority winners (or winner) 
on T can be candidates (or a candidate) in the second stage (i.e., voting 
on ¢>), and the majority winner in the second stage wins the office. This 
rule precludes coalitional government and guarantees a sole majority winner, 
thus any fiscal policy will locate on the contract curve of the consumers' ideal 
points , i.e., any majority winner will implement her ideal T and ¢>. Theorem 
3 guarantees the median-income voter as the sole majority winner when the 
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F1gure 2.4: S1multaneous Vot1ng Over CT, cp> 
Theorem 3: The median-income voter will prevail in any se-
quential voting over T and <P regardless of the agenda (i.e., voting 
on T and then ¢>, or on ¢> and then T). The political-economic equi-
librium is {m, T! ,¢>~,c.e . (T!,¢>~)}, where T! and ¢>~ are 1 or the 
solutions of simultaneous equations a:;; IIT=T" = 0 and a:;  114>=¢· = 0. 
Proof: It is known that every candidate j(j = 1, 2, ... , N) will propose 
his or her most preferable (Ti, ¢>i) if he or she comes to office because the 
campaign promise is not binding, so t he political compet it ion over space 
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(T, 4>) focuses on the contract curve of the consumers ' ideal points. I will 
prove the median-income consumer m is the Cordocet winner. I only consider 
the interior equilibrium T and </>, i.e ., T , 4> < 1. Corner equilibrium cases 
can be similarly proved. 
First, V j (j = 1, 2, ... , N), assume ON ~ Oi ~ . .. > Om ~ ... ~ 01 (sim-
ilarly for 0 i < Om), then 1 > T m > Tj and 1 > <Pi > 4>m . By contradict ion, 
if 1 > Tj ~ Tm, then because (Tj, </>i) is the most preferable choice for j , 
we have (Tj , 4>i)'c.i(Tm, 4>i) with Ti ~ Tm, a contradiction to Proposition 3. 
Similarly 1 > </>i > <f>m· 
Second, following Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 sequentially, 
where ">-1, ... ,m" is the preference relation by a t least consumers 1, 2, ... , m . 
Thus the median-income voter beats any other voter in binary competition. 
Q.E.D. 
It is interesting to note that theorems 1, 2 and 3 show that a version of 
the median voter theorem (Downs (1956)) holds in my sett ing. An economic 
version of the median voter theorem is the so called Director's Law. Stigler 
(1970) explains the philosophy of the Director's law as follows: "Government 
has coercive power, which allows it to engage in acts (above all, the making 
of resources) which could not be performed by voluntary agreement of the 
members of a society. Any portion of the society which can secu1·e control of 
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the state's machinery will employ the machinery to improve its own position. 
.. . This dom inant group will be the middle income classes." My 
result is reminiscent of that of Kramer and Snyder (1983), namely, the ob-
served stability and progressivity of income taxation in democratic societies 
arises from the success of the middle class in minimizing its own tax burden, 
at the expense of upper- and low-income taxpayers. 
R em ark: There are two special cases regarding the distribution of income 
that should be considered: (1) If ()i = () for all i(i = 1, 2, ... , N), then the 
wealth of the society is uniformly distributed. In this case, anyone is a 
median-income voter. Since all candidates will choose the same platform, 
anyone may win the election. It is interesting that in this case, the Bowen-
Lindahl-Samuelson condition implies a political-economic equilibrium as we 
wi ll see in the following Proposition 5. (2) If 3j(j = 1, 2, ... , N), s.t., 0; = 1, 
i.e., there exists a consumer j who is the only owner of the firm, then unless 
j is a dictator or has veto power, anyone other than j can be the winner, and 
it is obvious that Te = 1. This can be generalized to the conclusion that in 
an extremely unequal society (i .e. , few consumers control the economy), any 
political election will inevitably result in complete equalization of wealth. 
2.3.5 Uniform Distribution of Income 
In public economics, the so-called Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition (see 
Laffont (1988)) is well-known. The following proposition states that the 
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Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition implies a political-economic equilibrium 
when the distribution of income is uniform. 
Proposition 5: (1) If the distribution of income is uniform, then 
to satisfy the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition, i.e., there is 
I I 
(T, ¢>) such that '2:~ 1 2JLx~- = 1 and '2:~1 ~x~- = 1 is a sufficient condition 
.o 11 
for solving the political-economic equilibrium. 
(2) When x(.) = ~(.) = g( .) and 9 :<(:)) = g~(-~) , then the above 
g z z 
sufficient condition is necessary too. 
P roof: (1) On the one hand, when Oi = 1/N, c~ = <1-;,.Tlyt, then xlt = 
~( 1 - ¢>T) and x 2t = <f>Tyt. Thus ~~ = 0 and ~~ = 0 lead to 
0 
y I 0 I y I 1 I 
{ 
0 1 } 
</> -Nxo+Y~o - flNxo+fly~1 and 
0 
y I 0 I y I } I 
{ 
0 1 } 
T - NXo + Y ~o - fl NXo +fly ~1 • 
¢> of 0 and T of 0 because of Inada condition in equilibrium, ~~ = 0 and 
~~ = 0 is equivalent to the following equation. 
0 I 1 ~~ 1 I 1 ~~ 
Y Xo( - - -~ ) + fl y X 1 ( - - -~ ) = 0. 
N Xo N Xt 
(2.19) 
On the other hand, suppose there is (T, ¢>) satisfying the Bowen-Lindahl-
Samuelson condition, then recalling the assumption of the technology of pub-
lic good production (i.e., one unit of private good produces one unit of public 
good) , we have '2:~ 1 J9- = 1 and '2:~ 1 J/- = 1. 
X,0 X, 1 
I I 
Then because ei = 1/ N \ii= (1, ... , N), it must be lp_ = 1/ N and -4- = 
X,o X;1 
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1/N for all i. Obviously such (T, ¢>)solves (2.19). 
(2) Suppose (T, ¢>) solves the political-economic equilibrium, then 
when x(.) = e(.) = g(.) and g:~~~ = g'(1), (2.19) becomes (y0x~ + 
I 
,8y1 x~ ) {lf~~]- ~} = 0. i.e., lt~~] = ~, which implies ~x~' = 1/N and 
•0 
4 = 1/ N for all i. Summing up these two equations over consumers, we get 
X;1 
the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition. Q. E. D . 
2.3.6 Tax and Growth Rates 
One important focus of the endogenous growth li terature deals with the effect 
of fiscal policy on economic growth. Two questions are considered. Does the 
tax rate have any effect on the grO\'vth rate? If yes, is the growth rate posi-
tively or negatively related to the tax rate? Most of the neoclassical growth 
models agree that national taxation can substantially affect long-run rates 
of economic growth (King and Rebelo (1990)) . With regard to the direction 
of the effect of taxation on economic growth, most of the theoretical results 
claim that higher income tax rates translate into lower rates of growth.19 
However, the results of empirical studies are somewhat controversial due to 
different definitions, interpretations and measurements of government ser-
vices, and different coverage of countries (Landau (1983), Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), Grier and Tolluck (1987), and Barro (1990)) . 
19For key references in this literature, see Becker (1985), Judd (1985), Barro (1990) and 
Rebelo (1991). 
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In this subsection, I examine the relationship between the tax and growth 
rates. The process is intuitive and simple. I derive the partial derivative of 
K 1 with respect toT by combining the market-clearing conditions, first order 
conditions and budget constraints. I only consider the case when c?, c} > 0 
(cases when one of c? and c} is binding can be similarly considered). 
Taking the derivative with respect to T in 2::~1 c? = (1 - T)y0 and re-
calling y0 = F(K)- K 1 , I have 
-t oc? = - [F(K)- 1<1]- (1- T) f)J(l_ 
i=1 fJT oT 
Since c?,c} > 0, the first order conditions (2.9) and (2.10) are binding. 
(2.10)/(2.9) yields 
Substituting (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.11) gives 
{ 
- - 1 - ] !2(!<1 , N) (1- T) h(I<, N) + ()i[F(K)- K - N h(K, N) + F'(I<1) 
(); [ ( 1 ( 1 )] } o c} + F'(K1) F K)- Nh K ,N = ci + F'(K1)" (2.21) 
Taking the derivative with respect to T in (2.20), we have 
(1 - ¢>) F(J<1) (1 - ¢>)T F'(Kl)f)J(l] 
N + N fJT+ 
"[oc? (1-¢>)ToK1] 
Xo oT - N f)T + 
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(2.22) 
Taking the derivative with respect toT in (2.21 ) gives 
{ 
- - 1 - h(K
1 ,N) 
- j 2(K , N) + Oi[F(K)- K - N J2 (K , N)] + F'(I(t) + 
Oi[F(l(l)- N !2(1<
1
, N)]} ( _ T )fJK 1 {-O· 
+ F ' (I(1 ) + 1 oT ,+ 
(} [F'(I<1) - Nh1(K1,N)]F'(K 1)- F"(I<1)[F(I(l)- Nh(I\1,N)] 
+ i [F' (I<1 )]2 
!21 (1<1, N)F' (1<1 ) - j 2(1<t, N)F" (1<1)} 
+ [F'(/{1)]2 
oc? ~ F' (1(1) - c} F" (1(1 )~ . 
- oT + [F'(J(1 )]2 ' I.e., 
- [F' (1<1 )]
2 
{ h(K, N) + Oi[F(K)- K 1 - N h (K , N)]+ 
h(I<
1
,N) (}i [ ( 1) ( 1 )] } 
+ F'(J(I) + F'(I(1 ) F ]( - N h ]{ 'N + 
+ (1 - T) 0:~
1 
{ -Oi[F' (1<1 )]
2 + !21 (K\ N)F' (1<1) 
- h(I<1, N)F"(J<1)] + Oi[F'(K1) - Nf21(K 1 ,N)]F ' (I<1) 
- (} iF" (1<1 )[F(K1 ) - N f2(1\t' N)]} + cJ p " (](1 ) a;~t 
= [F' (J< 1 ) ] 2 ~; + F'(I< 1 ) ~~- (2.23) 
Rearranging (2.22) yields 
ocf 1 { II oc? ( 1 - <P) - } 
oT = {3F' (J(1 )X~ Xo[ f)T + N [F(K) - I< J 
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(2.24) 
Substitu ting (2.24) into (2.23), we get 
- [F' (1<1 )]
2 
{h(R, N) + O;[F(R)- I<1 - N !2(R, N)]+ 
!2(1<
1 
,N) 8; [ 1 1 )] } 
+ F'(I(l) + F'(I(l) F(I< ) - N !2(1< 'N + 
+ (1- T) 0;~
1 
{ -O;[F'(J<1 )]
2 + f21(K\N)F'(I< 1 ) 
- h(K1, N)F" (1<1)] + Oi[F' (1<1)- N f2 1 (1(1, N)]F' (1<1) 
- O;F" (1<1 )[F(I<1 ) - N h(K\ N)]} + ct p" (1<1) 0;~
1 
_ X~ [oc? (1- </>)[F(R) _ K 1] _ (1- ¢>)T 8K1 ] 
t3x~ 8T + N N 8T 
[F'(I<1 )]28c? _ x;F"(I<
1) 8K1 
+ 8T X~ 8T 
- (1- ¢>) F(J<1)F'(I<t)- (1 - </>)T[F'(K1 )]28K1 (2.25) 
N N M. 
Summing up (2.25) across all i' s, using (2.13) and (2.19), and simplifying, 
we have 
Since the first and third terms inside the braces of the left hand side of 
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the above equation are positive, and the second term is nonnegative, 88~
1 has 
the same sign as the right hand side. However, the first term on the right 
hand side is positive, while the second term , which depends on the type of 
utility functions and the distributions of income, may be positive or negative. 
Therefore, I have the following conclusion. 
Proposition 6: There is not a definite relationship between the 
tax and growth rates. The relationship between the tax and growth 
rates generally depends on the type of utility functions and the 
distribution of income. 
I will give two examples with different distributions of wealth in Subsec-
tion 2.3. 7 to show that when the tax rate increases, the growth rate increases 
too. In Section 2.4, I study a special type of utility function (namely a util-
ity function with constant elasticity of marginal utility of income20) which 
has the property that the growth rate is not a function of the tax rate (i.e., 
88~
1 
= 0) and the distribution of income. In other words, a free economy 
with a constant EMU! is fiscally and distributionally neutral. 
2.3. 7 Examples 
I examine two examples in which utility functions have increasing risk aver-
sion. In Example 1, by varying</> (the proportion of tax revenue used in the 
20From now on , I use EMUI as the abbreviation of elasticity of marginal utility of 
mcome. 
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public good production), I demonstrate that different weights of the public 
sector generate different growth paths and different welfare levels. Example 
2, together with example 1, shows that different distributions of f) lead to 
different sizes of government and different welfare levels. 
Example 1: Let u(x1 ,x2 ) = (log(xi + 1)] 19o
9
o + 0.20930x2If2, 
j(I(, L) = 1.2!(1/2 L112 + K , 
R = 25, L = 9, 8 = 0, and f3 = 1, 
fJI = ... = fJ1 = 0 and fJa = fJs = 0.5. 
It is not difficult to check that when XI < 99, 
XI { 1 -I} Rr(xi) = 1 + -
0 
[log(x1 + 1)] < 1 and 
XI + 1 1 0 
8Rr(xi) 
0 a > . X I 
Therefore condition a holds , and Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 are both 
valid. The first order conditions are: 
wo 0.6[(I/2 L -I/2 = 1; (2.26) 
w1 0.6(J(t)I/2L_'/2 = 0.2(J(t)1 /2; (2.27) 
p 1 (2.28) 
(2 + 1.8(1(1 r1/2) 
yo 68- /{1 (2.29) 
YI = 3.6(K 1 )
112 + 21\1 (2.30) 
p 
c~ + Pc~ 
1 I 
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ul[c} + ~y1' </>Ty1J. 
udc? + (1-:)T yo, </>TyDJ' 
{1 - T) {ei[(59- 1<1) + P {l.8(/(1)112) + 2PI<1J} 
(2.31) 
+ {1 - T)[1 + 0.2(/(1 )112 P] ; (2.32) 
(2.33) 
i=1 
(1 - T)y 1 • (2.34) 
Clearly, because of the given distribution of 0, each voter i(i = 1, ... , 7) 
is a median voter and can win the election. In addition, any i(i = 1, ... , 7) 
will propose T = 1 during the campaign21 and implement T = 1 when he or 
she comes into power. Thus (2.31 ) can be rewritten as: 
I 
(~y0 + 1 )[log(~y0 + 1)]100 1 
((1-:)T y1 + 1)[log( (1-:)T yl + 1 W~ - 2 + 1.8(J<1 )-I /2' 
Case 1: </> = 0.00 or ( 1 - </>) = 1.00. (2.31) becomes 
(2 + 1.8(/<1 r 112)(8.55556 - o.11111I<1 ) 
[Iog(8.55556- 0.11111J< 1 )p~ - (0.4(!( 1 ) 112 + 0.22222!( 1 + 1) 
I 
[log(0.4(I<1 / 12 + 0.22222/(1 + 1)] 100 . 
Since h'(I(1 ) < 0, there is a unique solution for I<1, t hat is (1(1 )e = 34.17941. 
21 It is obvious that given q>, T = 1 gives i the highest utility from consumption of both 
the public good and the private good (because he or she enjoys more benefit from the 
private good transfer than the tax cost he or she pays to the government). 
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Substituting K 1 into equations (2.26) to (2.30), we have CW0 )" = 1.00000, 
(W1 )" = 1.16926, p e = 0.43330, (y0 )" = 33.82059 and (y1 )" = 89.40556. 
And 
U = u(3.75784, 0) + u(9.93395,0) = 3.92398. 
Case 2: 4> = 0.20 or (1 - 4>) = 0.80. Similarly, the unique nonneg-
ative solution is: (K1 )" = 34.77731, (W0 )" = 1.00000, (M/1 )" = 1.17945, 
pe = 0.43380, (y0 )" = 33.22269 and (y1 )" = 90.78464. And U = 
u(2.95313, 6.64454) + u(8.06975, 18.15693) = 4.98908. 
Case 3 : 4> = 0.80 m· (1 - 4>) = 0.20. The unique nonnegative solution 
is: (J(l )" = 43.62335, (W0 )" = 1.00000, (W1 )" = 1.32096, pe = 0.44004, 
(y0 )e = 24.37665 and (y1 )" = 111.02397. And U = u(0.54170,19.50132) + 
u(2.46720, 88.81918) = 4.57398. 
Case 4: 4> = 0.90 or (1 - 4>) = 0.10. The unique nonnegative solution 
is: (J(l)e = 54.98424, (W0 )" = 1.00000, (W 1)" = 1.48303, pe = 0.44588, 
(y0 )" = 13.01576 and (y1)" = 136.66297. And U = u(0.14462, 11.71418) + 
u(1.51848, 122.99667) = 4.09976. 
Case 5: 4> = 0.95 or (1 - 4>) = 0.05. The unique nonnegative solution 
is: (1< 1 )" = 67.94598, (W0 )" = 1.00000, (W1 )" = 1.64859, p e = 0.45078, 
(y0 )e = 0.05402 and (y1 )" = 165.56653. And U = u(0.00030, 0.05132) + 
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Figure 2.5: GroWth Paths for Example 1 
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So Example 1 presents a situation in which growth becomes more dra-
matic as the weight of the public sector becomes larger and larger. In other 
words, consumers save more and more for future consumption when the fis-
cal policy becomes more and more public good-oriented (see Table 2.1 and 
Figure 2.5). 
Table 2.1 :Growth Paths for Example 1 
~~ Kl yo yl 
Case 1 0.00 34. 179 33.821 89.401 
Case 2 0.20 34.777 33.223 90.785 
Case 3 0.80 43.623 24.377 111.024 
Case 4 0.90 54.984 13.016 136.663 
Case 5 0.95 67.946 0.054 165.567 
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Example 2: Let if>= 0.8 and all assumptions in Example 1 remain valid 
except the distribution of 0. Now consider the following distribution: 
(}l = 0 0 0 = (}g = 1/9. 
Clearly because consumers are identical, they are not lending and borrowing 
among them. In addition, because the marginal productivity is greater than 
1, all leftovers of the first period consumption should be used in production. 
Thus Vi(i = 1, ... , 9), 
co = (1 - T)yo and c~ = (1 - T)yl 
1 9 1 9 
Since in equilibrium T =1- 1 due to Inada condition, c?, ct > 0, the first order 
conditions (2.9) and (2.10) are binding. Combining (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) 
yields the following equation. 
I 
[(68~T<~ )(1 - 4[ ) + 1j[log[(68~K~ )(1 - 4[) + 1Jroo 
I 
re·6(/(l)~/2+2J<I )(1 _ 4[) + 1][log[e·6(J<I) ~/2 +2J<I )(1 _ 4[) + 1]]100 
1 
/{
1 and T can be solved by the above equality and equation (2.17), ~~ = 0, 
or T = 1 if (2.17) has no solution. After simplification, (2.17), ~~ = 0, 
becomes 
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The unique nonnegative solution is: Te = 0.5, (1< 1 )e = 35.77307, (W
0r = 
1.00000, (W1)e = 1.19621, pe = 0.43460, (y0r = 32.22693 and (y1 )e = 
93.07800. And 
U = u(2.14849, 12.89050) + u(6.20528, 37.23040) = 5.13531, 
which is greater than 4.57398, the utility in case 3, Example 1 (see Table 2.2 
and Figure 2.6). 
Tab 1 e 2.2: D i str i but ions of 1 ncom e and Growth 
when <l> = 0.80 for Examples 1 and 2. 
~ T Kl yo y l u 
Example a~-... = a, 
=0 
1 9a=9srO.S 
1.00 43.623 24.377 11 1.024 4.574 
Exampl e 9t= ... =99 
2 = 1/9 0.50 35.773 32.227 93.078 5.135 
y 
















t - 1 




The fact that U = 4.57398, T = 1 and (/(1 r = 43.62335 when the 
distribution of () is: B1 = ... = ()7 = 0 and Bs = Bg = 0.5 (case 3, Example 
1) and U = 5.13532, T = 0.5 and (J(1 )e = 35.77300 when the distribution 
of () is: B1 = .. . = Bg = 1/9 (Example 2) is in sharp contrast with the 
statement of neoclassical growth models (Sato (1967), Becker {1985), Judd 
(1985), Barro (1990) and Rebelo (1991)) which claim that higher income tax 
rates translate into lower rates of growth. 
Remark: First, when the public good and the distribution of income play 
roles in endogenous growth models, I come to the same conclusion as that 
of traditional representative-agent-without-public-good models , namely, that 
national taxation can substantially affect long-run rates of economic growth 
(see King and Rebelo (1990)). However, my conclusion is that fiscal policy 
determines the endogenous growth of the economy, and the distribution of 
income decides fiscal policy. 22 There is not a definitely negative relation 
between income tax and g1·owth rates unless facto1·s that determine income 
tax rate are fixed. While the negative relationship between the income tax 
rate and the growth rate is too weak to explain the observed wide cross-
country differences in growth rates, my model may fill the gap. 
Second, by formulating an overlapping generations model that relates 
equilibrium growth to income inequality and political institutions and assum-
ing that fiscal policy only has a redistributive effect, Persson and Tabellini 
(1991) conclude that income inequality is harmful for growth. My point is 
that pre-tax income equality and post-tax income equality may have different 
22In fact , we will see later in Chapter 3, economic system is another determinant of 
income tax rate. 
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impacts on economic growth; as the above fact suggests pre-tax inequality 
may not necessarily be harmful for economic growth although it does jeop-
ardize social welfare. 
2.4 Constant Elasticity of Marginal Utility 
of Income 
Proposition 3 and Theorem 1, two of my major conclusions, need a sufficient 
condition which assumes that utili ty functions have an elasticy of marginal 
utility of income (Abbreviated as EMU I) not greater than one. The absolute 
and relati ve risk aversion measures were developed by Arrow (1965) and 
Pratt (1964) respectively. As Arrow (1965) pointed out that t he relative risk 
aversion is the elasticity of the marginal utility of weal th ; it is invariant not 
only with respect to changes in the units of utility but also with respect to 
changes in the uni ts of wealt h. 
In this section, I shall focus on utility functions with constant EMUI. The 
motivation is as follows: first, this kind of utility function is widely used and 
easy to examine; second, as we will see, this class of utility functions possesses 
some interesting properties. That is, utility functions in this section satisfy 
the following condition: 
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Condition {3: A utility function for the private good has a con-
stant EMUI, i.e., 
0 ( ) = ( -xfJ2U / fJx
2
) 
.~Lrx _ (fJU jfJx) =constant. 
Pratt {1964) claims that any utility function with a constant EMUI can 
be expressed in terms of a linear transformation of any one of the following 
three functions: 
(a) u(x) "' x1- c 
(b) u(x) "'log(x) 
if R,. (x) 
if R,. (x) 
(c) u(x)"' - x - (c-l ) if R,. (x) 
c < 1, 
1, 
c > 1. 
Remark: First , any risk-neutral utility function can be approximated by 
a type-a utility function as c approaches 0. Second, a type-c ut ility function 
violates condition a . An example will be given at the end of this chapter 
to demonstrate a counter-intuitive property, i.e., the wealthiest consumers 
prefer the highest tax rate. If I exclude type-c utility functions and focus on 
the first two types , then all results derived in the previous section are valid 
since now condition o. holds . 
When a utili ty function has a constant EMUI, I examine and answer the 
following three questions: ( 1) Does fiscal policy have any effect on macroeco-
nomic performance? (2) What is the relat ionship between the profit share of 
the decisive consumer and the income tax rate? (3) Can we always predict a 
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Kuznets curve, i.e., the hypothesis that income inequality first increases and 
then decreases with development? 
2.4.1 Fiscal and Distributional Neutrality 
In regard to the first question, whether fiscal policy has effect on macroeco-
nomic performance, I present the following proposition. 
Proposition 7: When condition {323 is satisfied, then (i) a free 
economy is fiscally and distributionally neutral; (ii) individual con-
sumption levels of the private good depend positively on fh and 
negatively on T. In other words, fiscal policy only has redistribu-
tive effects on the economy. 
Proof: (i) Because of the additive separability of the utility function 
(Assumption 1) and irrelevance of the public good to personal wealth, I 
can simply assume that the utility function of the private good is a linear 
combination of one of types (a), (b) and (c). First assume that the utility 
function is in the form of a+ bx1 -c, a, b > 0, c < 1 (I can similarly prove the 
case with type-b), then u 1 (x1, x 2 ) = b(l- c)x - c, and substituting into (2.20) 
yields 
t N · 
{ 
c~ + (l-<t>)T F(J<l) }-c 1 
c? + (1-;)r[F(K)- J(l] = {3F'(I(1)' I.e. , 
23In fact, this condition can be weakened as Vx1 , :i1 E R+: 
x' (xt) _ '(~) 
I -X . 
X (:il) :i1 
Interestingly, most of the noncompound fundamental functions share this property. 
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Summing up the above equations, and using (2.12) and (2.13), we get 
1 
(1- T</>)[F(k)- I<1) = [,BF'(J<1)]-c(l- T</>)F(I<1 ). 
Since in a political-economic equilibrium, T =J 1 or </> =J 1, 24 
I 
[F(R)- Kl] = [,BF'(Kl)rc F(I<l). (2.36) 
Thus the solution of /(1 , i.e. , Kf, is independent ofT,</>, and the distribution 
of(};. Substituting Kf into (2.6) , (2 .7), and (2.8), we can solve for all the 
other macroeconomic variables, i.e. , (W0r, (W1 r and p e, which are all 
independent ofT, </> and e;. 
(ii) Comparing (2.35) and (2.36), we have 
(2.37) 
Substituting the above equality into (2.11) , 
1 
[[,BF'((J<J )e)r c + p e]cJ = (1 _ T) {(Wo)e + p e(W1 )e + (}i[1l'o + 7l'IJ}. 
Therefore, cJ depends positively on (}; and negatively on T. A similar con-
24The case when T = 1 and ¢ = 1 cannot occur in a political-economic equilibrium, 
since no candidate would use up resources in the production of the public good because 
according to the lnada condition u1 (0, x 2) = + oo everybody could be better off by slightly 
reducing T or ¢ . 
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elusion can be drawn for c?. Q.E .D. 
2.4.2 Profit Share of the Decisive Consumer and In-
come Tax Rate 
The following proposition studies the relationship between the profit share of 
the decisive consumer (i.e., the median-income consumer) and the tax rate 
among different income distributions. 
Proposition 8 : If Conditions a and f3 are satisfied, and e:n and 
0~ are the profit shares of the d ecisive consumers corresponding to 
two distributions, t hen e:n > 0~ implies T!, ~ T~. The inequality is 
st rict if T!, < 1. 
Proof: (1) If e;,. <a:..~ 1/N, then T~ = T~ = 1. The proof is trivial 
since by selecting a proper ¢>, a decisive consumer (i.e. , the median-income 
consumer) with Om less than the average 0 can always be made better off by 
increasing the income tax rate. 
(2) If e;,. ~ 1/ N < e:n, then T!, < T~ = 1. By (1 ), T~ = 1. It is 
not difficult to prove that complete equalization as a result of T~ = 1 is not 
optimal for the median-income consumer with e:n larger than the average 0, 
1/N. 
(3) If 1/N < e;,_. < e:n, then <P:n = ¢>;,_. = 1 and T!, < T~ < 1. As 
in (2), T~ < 1. It can be proved that any </>m < 1, i.e. , 1 - <l>m > 0 is not 
optimal for the median-income consumer, since the redistributional portion 
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of tax revenue only benefits those consumers with () lower than the average. 
Thus, the only thing that needs to be proved is T! < T~. Recalling (2.17) 
in the proof of Proposition 3, a decisive consumer will select </> = 1 and T 
such that 
au II fJc~ I fJc~ I 0 I 0 1 I ( 1 
0 = fJT m = fJT Xo + f3 fJT X 1 + y ~ (Ty ) + {3y ~ Ty ) . 
Because of Condition {3 and Proposition 7, the above equalities for the two 
decisive consumers only differ in Im and T. Taking derivative with respect to 
Im and using Condition a, similarly as the proof of Proposition 3, we have 
at(~~) < 0. Q.E.D. 
Interestingly, if we interpret the size of government as the proportion of 
tax revenue to aggregate product, namely, the tax rate in this model , then 
Proposition 8 confirms the conclusion of Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) 
that an increase in mean income25 relative to the income of the decisive voter 
increases the size of government.26 
2.4.3 A Counter-Example to Kuznets Curve 
One well-known hypothesis that concerns an inverted-U relationship between 
per capita income and inequality is the Kuznets curve. Kuznets (1955, 1966, 
25The different personal incomes come from the different productivities in their paper 
rather than from the different profit shares as in ours. 
26For a complete survey of theories of the growth of government, see Lybeck (1988). 
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pp. 206-217) finds that income inequality first increases then decreases with 
development. 27 As Perotti (1990) points out , "empirically, this relation seems 
to be quite robust in cross-section studies, and has been consistently obtained 
for more than three decades. However, time series studies tend to cast doubts 
on the shape of the relation." Since technology level28 is generally positively 
associated with stage of development, the Kuznets curve can be restated 
as the hypothesis that income inequality first increases then decreases with 
technology level. Can we always predict an inverted U-1·elation between tech-
nology level and tax rate? The answer is no. The following proposition 
shows that when the median of the pre-tax income distribution is the same 
as mean, and the utility function is a linear combination of the same type-a 
(or type-b) utility functions of the private good and the public good, then in 
political-economic equilibrium, the tax rate is not a function of technology. 
In other words , the equilibrium tax rate only depends on the utility function , 
the weight of the public sector, and (possibly) the size of the population. 
Proposition 9: When the median of the pre-tax income distri-
bution is the same as mean, then equilibrium tax rates of types 
a and b are technology-proof. Specifically, (a) for a type-a utility 
function, u(x1 , x2) = A1x~-c + A2x~-c + A3 , where A1 > 0, A2 > 0 and 
27For a recent evaluation of the theoretical as well as the empirical work on the Kuznets 
curve, see Lindert and Williamson (1985) and Perotti (1990). 
28For example, in an economy with the Cobb-Douglas production function f(K , L) = 
AI<" £P, higher technology can be interpreted as larger coefficients A, a and {3. 
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A3 are constants, and c E (0, 1), 
(2.38) 
(b) For a type-b utility function, u(xh x2) = A1 log Xt +A2 log x2+A3, 
where A1 > 0, A2 > 0 and A3 are constants, 
(2.39) 
Proof: (a) According to Theorem 1, the median income consumer will 
be the majority winner and will eventually implement his or her ideal tax 
rate. Now, since the median of the pre-tax income distribution is the same 
as mean, Om = 1/N, the utility of the median consumer is as follows. 
Urn A, { (1 - T)~ + ( I ~ .P) Ty0 r' + A2(,PTy0 ) 1_ , 
+ f3 A, { (1 - T ) ~ + (I~ </>)Ty1 r' +/3A,(,PTy1) 1_ , + 2A, 
Recalling y0 = F(R ) - /{ 1 and y 1 = F (K 1 ), and substituting (2.36) into the 
above equation and simplifying, I have 
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According to Proposition 7, /{1 is not a function ofT, so 
i.e. , the marginal benefit of the private transfer equals the marginal benefit 
of the public good. Since c < 1 and ¢; =f 0 in equilibrium, the above equation 
implies 
(2.40) 
Solving the above equation and using Theorem 1, I get (2.38). Thus an 
equilibrium tax rate is technology-proof. 
(b) (2.39) can be similarly derived. Q.E.D. 
There are many explanations for the K uznets curve. 29 The above re-
sult provides another reason, namely the particular utility function, for the 
nonexistence of the Kuznets curve. I show that when the tax rate is fiat and 
the median of the income distribution is the same as mean , then a utility 
function with constant EMUI implies no Kuznets relation. Since it is un-
known under what conditions people have utility functions with EMUI, I do 
not know the robustness of Proposition 9. However, my conjecture is that 
different countries may have different utility functions because of different 
cultures, customs and geographic regions, and it is very likely that different 
29 As Lindert and Williamson (see Figure 1, Lindert and Williamson (1985)) point out, 
the more robust portion of the Kuznets Curve lies to the right: income inequality falls 
with the advance of per capita income at the higher levels of development. This may be 
the results of progressive fiscal policy, union strength, and the rise of the welfare state. 
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countries may have different relations between income inequality and devel-
opment. In any case, Proposition 9 does give a theoretical counter-example 
of the Kuznets curve under certain conditions. Thus it is not surprising at all 
that some scholars have found evidence which does not supports the Kuznets 
curve (Saith (1983) and Ram (1988)). 
Having (2.38) (or (2.39)), we can undertake a comparative study for in-
terior value ofT with respect to</>, A1, A2 , N, and c for a type-a (or</>, A1 
and A2 for a type-b) utility function. 
Corollary 1: For a type-a utility function, ~~ < 0, :r < 0, :r > 
0, g~ > 0, and ~~ > (oT =, or <) 0 if 17 < (or =, OT >) iJ. And 
limN-= <f>T = 1. 
Proof: Taking derivatives of T with respect to </>, A1 , A2, N, and c re-
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</>[N + ( Al~)c] 
> 0; 
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Therefore the tax rate depends positively on A2 and N and negatively on A1 
and </>. 
(2.40) can be rewritten as 
(2.41) 
Since <PT :S: 1, ( <f>Trc 2 1; however on the left hand side, when N ----+ oo, 
N~:. c ----+ 0, so it must be (1 - <f>T) ----+ 0, i.e., <j>T ----+ 1. Q.E.D. 
Remark: One interesting implication of Corollary 1 is that the equilib-
rium tax rate increases as the size of the population increases. This might 
provide another explanation for the widely observed growth of government. 
The reason behind this result is that when the size of the population in-
creases, the first term in the left hand side of (2.41) decreases, given the 
other variables, and only a larger T can make the equality (2.41) valid. 
Similarly, I present the following corollary concerning the relation between 
T and A1, or A2 , or 4> in (2.39) for a type-b utility function. 
Corollary 2: For a type-b ut ility function, ~~ < 0, :L < 0, and 
8T 0 
8 A2 > . 
P roof: The proof follows from taking derivatives ofT with respect to </>, 
A1 and A2 respectively in (2.39). As seen, the effects of </>, A1 and A2 on T 




E xample 3: All assumptions of Example 1 are valid except that u(x1, x 2 ) = 
x~ 12 + x;12 and the distribution of() is arbitrary. Since Rr(x) = 1/2 < 1, 
conditions a and f3 hold , Propositions 3 to 8, and Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are 
all valid. The first order conditions are (2.26) to (2.34). Substituting the 
utility function and (2.28) to (2.30) into (2.31), we have 
~[cJ + ¥(3.6(!(1)1/2 + 2J(l)fl /2 1 . 
~[c? + (1-:)T (68- J(l )fl/2 = 2 + 1.8(/(1 rl/2' I.e., 
c? + (1- ¢>)T (68- J(l) = 1 2[cJ + (1- ¢>)T (3.6(1<1)1/2 
9 (2 + 1.8(!<1 rl/2) 9 
+ 2](1 )]. 
Summing up the above equality and using (2.37) yields 
As argued before, in equilibrium, T =J 1 or <P =J 1 so we have 
Since h' (!<1 ) > 0 if I<1 ~ 0, and 
h( 45.54354) = 0.00007 > 0 and h( 45.54353) = - 0.00001 < 0. 
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Thus there is a unique nonnegative solution for I<1 , i.e. , (1(1 t = 45.54353, 
which I substitute it into (2.26) to (2.30), producing woe = 1, W 1 e = 
1.34972, pe = 0.44117, y0e = 22.45647, y1e = 115.38200, ( 1r0 )e = 13.45647, 
and ( ~ )e = 103.23453.3° Comparing (2.40) with (2.41) , we get c? = P 2 cJ = 
0.19463c~. Substituting c? = 0.19463c} into (2.32), we can solve both c? and 
1 . c;, 1.e., 
cJ = (1- T )(2.50937 + 92.7971811;) and 
c? = (1- T)(0.48840 + 18.061128;). 
Therefore we confirm Proposition 7, that fiscal policy has no effect on 
macroeconomic performance, although it does affect personal consumption. 
Suppose 8m = 1/9, then substituting (I<1t, 8;, c? and c} into our utility 
function , we have 
U u {2.49516(1 - ¢>T ), 22.45647¢>T} + u {12.82022(1 - ¢>T) , 115.38200¢>T} . 
After simplification, condition ~~ = 0 becomes ¢>T = 9(1 - ¢>T). It can be 
verified that this equation also guarantees ~~ = 0, and ¢>T = 0.931 is the 
solution which leads to utility U = 16.31780 for the median voter regardless 
of any combination of (T, ¢>) that satisfies ¢>T = 0.9. Clearly the median 
voter is much better off now than when there is no government (in that case 
his or her utility is U = 5.16014). 
30This is an economy with increasing marginal productivity (i.e., W 1 > W 0 ), deflation 
(i.e., P < 1), increasing of profit in real terms (i.e . , (~)> 1r0), and increasing of average 
I 0 
personal consumption (i.e. , ~ > ~ ). 
31If tjJ < 0.9, then tjJT < 0.9 and ~~ > 0, thus T = 1. 
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Furthermore, if all 0; = 1/9 and any candidate picks (T, <P) such that 
</JT = 0.9, then for each period t(t = 0, 1) , we have Vi(i = 1. 2 .... ,N), 
au j8x2 (22.45647<PTr1; 2 1 (1- <PT) 1; 2 1 
8Uj8x;1 - [2.49516(1- 4>T)r112 = 3[ 4>T ] 9 
Thus Ef=1 ;~ j;;,~ = 1. A similar result applies for t = 1. Therefore we have 
'fi d p .t. 5 b ""9 au;ax2 1 ven e ropos1 Ion ecause wi=I au ;ax,1 = · 
Example 4: Consider u(xt, x 2) = A- x~
1 /2 - x2.112, according to Pratt 
(1964), R,.(x) = 1.5. Assuming all assumptions of example 3 hold and fol-
lowing the same steps as example 3, we find that if T =/: 1 or 4> =/: 1, then 
and h' (!< 1) < 0 if I<1 ~ 0. As before, we have a unique nonnegative 
solution: (I<t)e = 26.92714, (W0r = 1, (W1r = 1.03783, p e = 0.42610, 
(y0r = 41.07286, (y1 t = 72.53517. ( rr0 )e = 32.07286, and (~ )e = 63.19473. 
In addition, 
c? = (1 - T)(0.82295 + 33.666370;) and 
cJ = (1 - T)(l.45334 + 59.454960;). 
It is not surprising that we have not found any different conclusions re-
garding Proposition 7 between the above examples 3 and 4 because they 
share condition [3. However , because example 4 violates condition a, I ex-
pect it to have a different relationship between the willingness to tax and 
income. This turns out to be true. Substituting Rr(x) = 1.5, N = 9 and the 
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solution of all related variables into 
a au au { (1 - <P) a 1 } ao, (aT)=- ao; [ N (y + Py )Rr(O,)JjO, + [1- Rr(O;)J 
and simplifying, we have 
a au 
ao; (aT)< o {:::::::} o; < 0.40667(1- <P)- o.o2444; 
a~;(~~) = 0 {:::::::} 0; = 0.40667(1 - <P) - 0.02444; 
a au 
ao; (aT) > 0 {:::::::} 0; > 0.40667( 1 - </>) - 0.02444. 
As long as <P < 0.93990 or (1- 4>) > 0.06010, 0.40667(1- </>)- 0.02444 = 
0* > 0, then if 0 ~ 0; < 0* , the willingness to tax decreases as profit share 
increases; if 0; = 0* , the willingness to tax is a constant; if 0* < 01 ~ 1, the 
willingness to tax increases as profit share increases. This is counter-intuitive, 





0 .000 0. 179 1.000 
F1gure 2.7: Prof1t Share and the Marg1nal Ut111ty 
or Tax for Example 4. 
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2.5 Summary 
Now I am able to answer the questions posed in the Introduction. First, it is 
possible to explain observed differences in long-run growth rates without rely-
ing on exogenous changes in technology or population. Given technology and 
population, a country's economic growth is determined by its fiscal policy, 
which is in turn decided by the distribution of income and factors that influ-
ence the form of utility functions. Second, a higher tax rate is not definitely 
associated with a lower rate of economic growth. Third, a political-economic 
equilibrium does exist when candidates compete for office by selecting dif-
ferent fiscal policies. In equilibrium, the median-income consumer will be 
the majority winner of the binary electoral process. Fourth, in general, the 
wealthier consumers are more likely to oppose a higher tax rate or a larger 
government. Fifth, under constant EMU!, fiscal policy and income distribu-
tion have no effects on economic growth. Sixth, an increase in mean income 
relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government. 
Seventh, the Kuznets curve is essentially an empirical observation and lacks 
solid theoretical support. Proposition 9 shows that the income tax rate does 
not respond to technical change (i .e., economic development). 
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Chapter 3 
Fiscal Policies, Optimal 
Growth, and Elections in a 
Democratic Planned Economy 
3.1 Model 
3.1.1 Basic Assumptions 
In this chapter, I study fiscal policies, optimal growth, and elections in a 
democratic planned economy. The democratic planned economy here is not 
the traditional authoritarian planned economy since an authoritarian planned 
economy does not have elections. The democratic planned economy I study 
in this chapter has the following two fundamental properties. First, there are 
elections. Second, the elected government directly controls the growth of the 
economy. Thus a democratic planned economy differs from an authoritarian 
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planned economy in a political respect, i.e., whether there are elections. And 
a democratic planned economy and a free economy differ in the way the 
economy is controlled (di rectly or indirectly). 
In reality, two kinds of economies can be fit into my category of democratic 
planned economies. The first kind of democratic planned economies refers 
to some Western European countries (such as France and Sweden) where 
the public sectors are large enough such that governments' decisions on the 
wages, prices and growth rates of public sectors can substantially influence 
the wages, prices and growth rates of the economy as a whole. The second 
kind of democratic planned economies includes most of the Eastern European 
countries and former Soviet Republics. In those transitional economies, first, 
the private sector economy has not become a dominant factor in the economy; 
second, property rights are not well protected; third, market mechanisms are 
still immature. Thus, elected governments still control wages, prices and 
economic growth rates. 
Consider a planned economy with a government and consumers.1 I 
assume there are two kinds of output, namely a private good X 1 and a 
public good X 2 , and two kinds of input, namely capital K and labor L in 
the economy. As before, I assume pt to be the price of a unit of output X 1 
delivered in period t , and W' to be the real wage rate in period t. 
Suppose there is a political election using some binary procedure under 
majority rule. Any consumer can be a candidate and compete with other 
candidates by selecting a platform of price ratio, wage rates and capital 
1 I neglect firms because the government in a planned economy owns the firms and 
controls wage rates, prices and capital stocks. 
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stocks. Eventually, one of the N consumers is elected and implements those 
macroeconomic variables he proposed during the campaign. 
Assume that each consumer i(i = 1, 2, .. . , N ) lives two periods and has 
a discount rate f3 E [0, 1]. In each period i has one unit of time to spend and 
has a utility function u(x;1 , x 2 ), where x;1 and x 2 are i's consumption levels 
of the private good X 1 and the public good X 2 in period t respectively. The 
production technologies of the private good and the public good are assumed 
to be the same as those in chapter 2 and capital stock in period 0, I<0 is 
given as f<. 
Because government owns the firm, I assume that the government keeps 
a fixed portion of the profit and this part of profit becomes the government's 
revenue. As before, government revenue can be used either in the transfer of 
the private good for the purpose of redistribution and/ or the production of 
the public good. 
The profit left over is owned by consumers. Each consumer i shares a 
fixed fh E [0, 1 ](L:~1 (); = 1). All assumptions in Chapter 2 are valid. 
3.1.2 Notation and Timing of the Model 
N is the number of consumers; and t, which is used as a time index, is 
0 or 1; 1/J is the fixed share of profit by government; </> is the proportion 
of government revenue used in the public good production; (1 - <P) is the 
proportion of government revenue used in the private good transfer; the 
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price of X 1 in period 0 is taken as a numerare, i.e., P0 = 1; P 1 = P is the 
price of xl in period 1; w is the real wage rate; y is the amount of xl sold 
by the firm; K is the aggregate capital input; L is the aggregate labor input; 
1r
0 = y0 - W 0 L 0 is the profit of period 0; 1r1 = P(y1 - W 1 £1) is the profit of 
period 1; Bi (2::::~ 1 Bi = 1) is consumer i's fixed share of the profit excluding 
the government's share; li is the amount of labor supplied by consumer i; (3 
is the discount factor for each consumer; Ci is the pre-transfer consumption 
level of X1 by consumer i; Xi! is the total consumption level of X1 (including 
transfer from the government) by consumer i; x2 is the consumption level of 
the public good by each consumer; and Ui is the sum of discounted utilities 





L (3tu(x~1 , x;) where 
t=O 
c? + (1 ~</>)'1/;[F(K)- 1{ 1 - NvV0 ] 
cJ + (1 ~</>)'l/;[F(J< 1)- NW1 ] 
</>'1/;[F(i<)- ](1 - NW0 ] 
¢>1/;[F(1<1)- NW1]. 
The model and its timing are given below (see Figure 3.1): 
In stage 0 , given the set of consumers and a fixed binary voting proce-
dure, each consumer decides whether he or she will be a candidate. If he or 
she decides not to be a candidate, his or her opponent automatically wins 
the binary competition and goes to the next branch of the voting tree. 
In stage 1, a. candidate j (j = 1, 2, .. . , N) proposes a. set of wage rates 
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Wi0 , W}, price Pj, and capital stocks I<}, I<J in order to maximize his or 
her own utility which is given in stage 2 for any consumer. 
In stage 2, for any given W0 , W\ P, /(1 and /(2 (for simplicity we omit 
all subscripts later on) , a consumer i(i = 1, 2, .. . , N) chooses d, zt to maxi-
mize his or her sum of discounted utilities. 
1 
maxU; = maxl: /Jtu (x~1 ,x;) (3.1) 
t =O 
1 1 
s.t. L pte:~ L p t { w t + 0;(1 -1/J)[F(/(t)- J( t+l - NWtJ} 
t=O t =O 
N 
O ~Lt~1, c~~ O , 0~0;~ 1 , l:Oi=1, andt=O, l. 
i=l 
Then each consumer solves c? and cJ in terms of the proposed macroeco-
nomic variables, i.e., (c?r = c?(ltV0 , W 1 , P, !(1 ,1(2 ) and 
In stage 3 , each consumer i( i = 1, 2, ... , N) votes for 
1 
j = arg max L u[x~1 (W0 , W 1 , P, !( 1 ), x;(W0 , W 1 • P, !( 1 )] 
t=O 
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and if indifferent , splits the vote. 
In stage 4, the candidate with the larger number of votes in each binary 
competition is elected and implements the set of macroeconomic variables he 
or she proposed during the campaign. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage J Stage 4 
J, v(j)> 
Winner Consumer 1: Votes ror v(k) goes elected 
OJ Qk ..... (J•I, ... ,N> r-. I_. to next ~ lmplems 
j.K s I, ... ,N max U 
argmax U 
pairwise his a 
voting 
Q•(WO,WI,P,KI) 
F tgure 3.1: Ttm lng ror a Democratic Planned Economy 
There are some differences between this model and the one in a free 
economy: first , the government here controls all macroeconomic variables; 
while the government in a free economy only indirectly controls the economy 
through tax policy. Second, the government in a free economy uses some of 
the tax revenue to produce the public good and make private good transfers, 
while the government in a democratic planned economy sets somewhat lower 
wage rates to generate profit and uses its fixed share of the profit to produce 
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the public good and make private good transfers. 
3.1.3 Definitions 
Definition 5: Given W 0 , W 1 , P and K 1 , a competitive equilibrium in a 
democratic planned economy is an allocation { ( cL lf)} !=o for consumer i( i = 
1, 2, .. . , N), s.t. , {(cL l~)}!=o solves (3.1) at the stated prices. 
Definition 6: A political-economic equilibrium in a democratic planned 
economy is a set of a consumer (or consumers) {j} j=l,Z, ... ,N' a four-tuple 
policy instrument (a set of four-tuple policy inst ruments) (W0 , WI, P, K 1 ) , 
and a competitive equilibrium corresponding toW?, Wf, Pj and KJ, denoted 
by c.e. ( wp, Wf , Pj, KJ) , such that 
solves the model (stages 1 to 4) in 3.1.2. 
Definition 7: A democratic planned economy is distributionally neutral 
if all m acroeconomic variables K 1 , W 0 , W 1 and P are independent of (). 
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3.2 Main Conclusions 
3.2.1 Exist e nce of a Competit ive Equilibrium 
For a typical consumer, it is obvious that he or she supplies all available 
factor L, because L causes no disutility to him or her, i .e., 1° = 11 = 1, thus 
L 0 = L 1 = N. It is also clear that y2 = 0 because period 2 is the end of 
the world. As before le t u(x!u x~) = x(x~1 ) + ~(x~). For any consumer i, by 
taking first derivatives with respect to c?, CJ, A; (Lagrangian multip lier), P, 
W 0 , W 1 , ](1 , I have the following first order conditions: 
I 
A;' c9 > 0 (3.2) Xo < ' -
f3x~ < A;P c1 > 0 ' - (3 .3) 
wo + 8;(1 - 7/; )[F(K)- ](1 - NW0 ] 
+ P {W1 + 8;(1 - 7/;)[F(K1)- NW1J} ~ c? +PeL A; ~ 0 (3.4) 
A;c}::; A; {W1 + 8;(1-7/;)[F(/(1)- NvV1J}, P ~ 0 (3.5) 
A;[1- 8;(1- 7/;) N] :S: (1- ¢)7/Jx~ + ¢7/;N~~, W 0 ~ 0 (3.6) 
A;P[1- 8;(1 - 7/;)N] :S: (3[(1 - ¢)7/Jx~ + ¢7/JN~~J, W1 ~ 0 (3.7) 
(1 - ¢>)1/; I - .-1-.J. tl (3(1- ¢)7/; FI(J<l) I t:l.-1-.!.pi(J<l)tl 
N Xo 'f''P<,o + N Xt + fJ'f''P <,1 
8;(1- 7/;)A; + 8;(1 - 7j;)PF 1 (1( 1 )A; :S: 0, K 1 ~ 0. (3.8) 
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I can now prove the following proposition regarding the optimal problem 
for each consumer. 
Proposition 10: Each consumer i (Vi= 1, 2, ... , N) has a unique 
set of 
which solves his optimal problem. 
Proof: Because the marginal utility of income A; > 0, by the Kuhn-Tucker 
Theorem, (3.4) is binding. Since A; > 0 and X~ > 0, by (3.3) , P > 0, thus 
(3 .5) is binding, i.e. , 
(3.9) 
Substituting (3.9) into (3.4), we have 
(3.10) 
By the Inada condition limK-+O f 1 (I<, N) = +oo, I< 1 > 0, thus (3.8) is binding 
too. 
There now remain four inequalities, i.e., (3.2), (3.3), (3.6) and (3.7), that 
remain undetermined whether they are binding or not . For simplicity, let 
p rp'lj; 
11- 8;(1- 1/J ) + (1 -Nrp)'lj; 
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Case 1: Both (3.6) and (3.7) are not binding. Now by Kuhn-Tucker 
Theorem, W 0 = W 1 = 0. 
First, let (); > 0. Substituting(); into (3.10) and (3 .9), I have 
c~ = • ()i(1 - 1/;)F(I<
1) > 0 
c1 
t = ();(1 - 1/J )[F(i<) - I<1) > 0. 
Since c? and c~ are both greater than 0 because of F(I<1) > 0 and F(K) -
I< 1 > 0 (guaranteed by the Inada condition) , (3.2) and (3.3) are binding. 
Using (3.2), (3.3), (3.9) and (3.10) in (3.8) yields 
H (I<1) - - 1tx' {~t[F(R)- I<1]}- p{ {p[F(R )- Iel} 
+ ,Bpx'[pF(I<1)]F'(I<1) + ,BpF'(I<1){[pF(I<1)] = 0. (3.11) 
Since H' (1<1) = P2X~ + ,B[pF' (1<1 )]2 X~ + P2~~ + ,B[pF' (1<1 ))2 ~~~ + 
,Bpx~F"(I< 1 ) + (3p~~F"(I<1 ) < 0, and limf_.0 H (t:) = +oo and 
lim--o H[F(K) - t:] = - oo, :3 a unique I<1 E (0, F(K)) which solves (3.8) . 
Then by (3.9) and (3.10), I can solve for unique c? and cJ. By (3.2) and (3 .3), 
I 
~ = P also gives unique P. 
x1 
Second, (); = 0, then c? = ct = 0, and (3.8) can be rewritten as 
H(I<1 ) - - (1 ~</>)1/; x' { (1 ~</>) 1/;[F(K)- J<1]} - p( {p[F(k)- J<1J} 
+ (3(1- </>)1/; x '[(1- </>)1/; F(I<1)]F'(I<1) + (3pF'(I<1){ [pF(I<1)] = 0. 
N N 
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Similarly as part 1, H' (1<1) < 0, ](1 is uniquely determined. By using 
P can be uniquely solved. 
Case 2: (3.6) is binding, while (3. 7) is not. Then by the Kuhn-
Tucker Theorem, W 0 > 0 and vV1 = 0. Similarly as case 1, if fh > 0 (the 
case Bi = 0 can be proved similarly), we have c? , cJ > 0. Hence (3.2) and 
(3.3) are binding. Using (3 .2), (3.3), (3.9) and (3 .10), (3.6) and (3.8) can be 
rewritten as 
J.Lx' {rW0 + J.L[F(K)- K 1J}- p( {p[F(K)- I<1 - NW0 J} 
+ ,BF'(I<1 )J.Lx'[J.LF(K1 ) ] + ,8pF'(K1 )([pF(I<1 )] = 0. (3.13) 
Using (3 .12) in (3.13) yields 
Taking the derivative with respect to /( 1 in the above equation and solving 





First, /(1 is uniquely determined. Let 
LH5(3.12)- RH5(3.12) 
rx' {rW 0 + 1-L[F(I{)- K 1J}- pN( {p[F(K)- ](1 - NW0 J}. 
Taking the derivative with respect to ](1 , using (3.14) and simplifying, I 
can verify H' (I(l) < 0. I am now able to prove the uniqueness of /( 1 • (i) 
H(O) :S 0, then combining H(O) :S 0 and H' (!<1 ) < 0 yields H(I(l) < 0 
for all /( 1 E (0, F(K)]. By the Inada condition, /( 1 =/= 0, thus H(K1 ) < 0 
for all ](1 > 0, which contradicts the assumption that (3.6) is binding. (ii) 
H(O) > 0, then because limKI-+F(K)-Nwo H(K 1 ) = -oo, VW0 > 0, 3 a 
unique /( 1 E (0, F(K)) satisfying H(K 1 ) = 0. 
Second, W 0 , vV1 , P , c?, cJ are all uniquely determined for any 
given J(l. Clearly W 1 = 0 is unique. If I can prove that W 0 is unique, 
then c? and c; are unique too because of (3.9) and (3.10) . Then by (3.2) and 
(3.3) , P is unique too. Now let G(W0 ) = LH 5(3.12) - RH 5(3.12). Then it 
is easy to check G' (W0 ) < 0. (i) If G(O) :S 0, then combining G' (W0 ) < 0 
and W 0 > 0, we have G(W0 ) < 0, which contradicts the assumption that 
(3.12) is binding. (ii) If G(O) > 0, then by limwo F (RJ - K l G(W0 ) = -oo and 
-+ N 
G' (W0 ) < 0, 3 a unique Hf 0 E (0, F(Kk-I<1 ) such that (3.12) holds. 
Case 3: (3.6) is not binding, while (3. 7) is binding. The unique 
existence of { W 0 , WI, P, ](1 , c?, cD can be similarly proved as Case 2. 
Case 4: Both (3.6) and (3.7) are binding. Then by the Kuhn-Tucker 
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Theorem, W 0 , W 1 > 0, by (3.9) and (3.10), c?, cJ > 0, thus both (3.2) and 
(3.3) are binding. Substituting (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.8), I have 
A; { (
1 ~<P)1/Y + [~- 0;(1 -1/Y)- (1 ~</J)1/Y] + 0;(1- 1/Y)} [1- PF'(I(1 )] 
A; [ I ( 1 - - N 1- PF K )] = 0. 
Recalling A; =X~> 0, I have P = F'(~(l)" Using (3.2), (3.3), (3.9) and (3.10), 
we can rewrite (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) as follows. 
rx' { rW0 + 11[F(K) - K 1J} = pN( {p[F(R)- K 1 - NW0J} (3.15) 
rx'[rW1 + 11F(K1 )] = pN( {p[F(K1 ) - NW1 J} (3.16) 
x' {rW0 + 11[F(K)- K 1J} = ,BF'(I(1 )x'[rW1 + 11F(I(1 )]. (3.17) 
Taking derivatives with respect to /{1 in (3.15) and (3.16) gives 
aW0 
II 2 II 
TflXo- P N~o 
(3 .18) = 2 "+ ( N)2(' (JJ(l T Xo P o 
aW1 (p2 N~~- TflX~)F'(/(1 ) 
(3 .19) = 
r2x~ + (pN)2~~~ (JJ(l 
First, /{1 l S uniquely determined. Let H(I( 1 ) = RHS(3.17) -
LH 5(3.17) = 0. Taking the derivative with respect to /{1 , using (3 .18) 
and (3.19) and simplifying, I have H' (K1 ) < 0. 
Using (3.15) and (3.16) , H(I{ 1 ) can be rewritten as 
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Because H' (K1 ) < 0, and li~-o H( ~:) = + oo and lim,_0 H[F(R)- ~:] = 
-oo, :3 a unique /{1 E (0, F(R)) satisfying (3.17) . 
Second, W 0, W 1 , P, c?, CJ are all uniquely determined for any given 
K 1 • Let G(W0 ) = LHS(3.15)- RH S(3.15) = 0, then the uniqueness of W 0 
can be similarly proved as the second part in Case 2. Similarly, W 1 is unique. 
So are c? , CJ and P. Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1: If '1/; > 0 and i (Vi= 1, . . . , N) has a large profit share 
such that 
e . > _1 ...,---_,_( 1_---,-:..-.:<P )....:....'~/; 
' - (1- '1/;) N ' 
then he or she will propose W 0 = w·1 = 0. 
Proof: Since ei > 0, then by (3.9) and (3.10) , c? > 0 and c} > 0. Therefore 
(3.2) and (3.3) are binding. Substituting (3.2) into (3.9), I have 
If ei ~ 1 (t(~~j~"', since Ai ~ 0, Ai[1- Bi(l- '1/; )N - (1- <P)'!f;] :S: 0, however 
'1/; > 0, and ~; > 0, therefore inequality (3.6) is never binding, t hus W 0 = 0 
by the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem . Similarly, W 1 = 0. Q.E.D. 
3.2.2 Existence of Voting Equilibrium 
One might suspect that as a mult i-dimensional problem (in terms of W 0 , 
W 1 ,P, !{1 ), the election in a democratic planned economy will lead us to 
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nowhere, i.e., no political-economic equilibria or infinity of equilibria. For-
tunately I can prove strict quasi-concavity (Proposition 10 below) of U on 
W 0 , WI, P, Kl, thus according to Kramer (1972), there exists a voting equi-
librium X 0 E Rt , such t hat none of the individual components of any feasible 
change (i.e., change X 0 only by one dimension each time) from X 0 will be 
preferred to the status quo by any decisive coalition. 
Proposition 11: (a) The utility function in (3.1) is strictly qua-
siconcave in W 0 , W 1 , P, ](1 • 
(b) There exists a voting equilibrium X 0 which will defeat any 
feasible change in only one dimension. 
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= >.;0;(1- ~)F'(/(1 ) 
= [(1 -:)~]2 X~ + (¢~)2 N~~ 
= -/3 [(1 -:)~]2 F' (/(1 )x~ - /3( ¢~ )2 N F' (/(1 )~~ 
= >.;0;(1 - ~ )F' (/(1 ) 




[(1 - ¢)~F'(J(1)]2 II /3(1 - ¢)~ F"(Kl) / 
+ N2 X1 + N X1 
+ /3 [¢~F'(J(1)] 2~~, + f3¢~F"(I(1)~~ -
After simplification, the determinant of the second order derivative is 
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{3(1 - ¢> )1/J I I 
[Ai0i(1 - 1/J )P + N Xt + {3¢>1/Jet] 
+ ,a[V>"·~(I<'Jl'l(l- ¢J'x; + (¢NJ'e;J} < o. 
Thus the utility function is strictly quasi concave in W 0 , W 1 , P, !{1 be-
cause it is negative definite (see Diewert, Avriel and Zang (1981)). 
(b) By Kramer (1972), there exists a voting equilibrium 
such that none of the individual components of any feasible change from X 0 
will be preferred by any decisive coalition to the status quo. Q.E.D. 
3.2.3 Uniform Distribution of Income 
Similarly to Proposition 5, when the distribution of wealth is uniform, I can 
prove that satisfying the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for achieving a political-economic equilibrium. 
Proposition 12: If 1/J > 0, ¢> > 0,2 the distribution of wealth IS 
uniform, and W 0 , W 1 , c?, ct > 0, then to satisfy the Bowen-Lindahl-
Samuelson condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
political-economic equilibrium. 
2 Any economy with 'lj; = 0 or/ and ¢ = 0 produces no public good and is not socially 
efficient because of the lnada condition. 
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Proof: (Necessity) Suppose there is a set of (W0 , W\ P,1(1 ) which solves 
a political-economic equilibrium. Since W 0 , W 1 > 0, by the Kuhn-Tucker 
Theorem, (3.6) and (3.7) must both be binding. Applying the result of case 
4, the proof of Proposition 10, (3.15) , (3 .16) and (3 .17) are all satisfied. Now 
with 'ljJ > 0, ¢ > 0 and 8; = 1/ N, (3.16) can be rewritten as 
~~ T 1-8i(1-'ljJ)N -(1-¢)'1jJ 1 
-1---
Xo pN <P~f;N N 
I I 
Thus l:f:1 ~ = 1. Similarly, by (3.9), l:f:1 ~ = 1. 
(Sufficiency) First, c?, cJ > 0 corresponds to Case 4, the proof of Propo-
sition 10. As known, a political-economic equilibrium is characterized by 
equations (3.15), (3.16), (3.17) and P = F~(~<1 ) and its corresponding eco-
nomic equilibrium. By Proposition 10, for any given ( W 0 , W 1 , P,l(1 ), its 
economic equilibrium always uniquely exists. Thus the only thing that needs 
to be proved is to show there is (W0 , W 1 ,P,1(1 ) such that (3.15), (3.16), 
(3.17) and P = F'(~<1 )" 
Second, since all 8; = Ji, to satisfy the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condi-
tion implies 
xl { TW0 + Jl[F(k)- K 1l} = N( {p[F(k)- K 1 - NW0 J} 
X
1
[TW1 + flF(K1 )] = N( {p[F(I(1 )- NW1J}. 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
These two equations are equivalent to (3.15) and (3.16) when 8; = 1/N Vi= 
1, ... ,N. 
Third, substituting 8i = 1/N, (3 .20) and (3.21) into (3.8), and simplify-
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ing, I have 
I I 1) I 
Xo = f3F (I( Xt· (3.22) 
This is exactly (3.17). Recalling c?, c~ > 0 and applying the Kuhn-Tucker 
I 
Theorem, (3.2) and (3.3) are binding. Thus f3~ = P. Comparing the above 
x1 
equation with (3.22), we have P = F~(~<1 ). Q.E.D . 
3.2.4 Limitation of Electoral Outcomes 
Proposition 11 states there exists a voting equilibrium which will defeat any 
feasible change in only one dimension in a democratic planned economy. Thus 
only sequential voting over ( W 0 , W 1 , P, !(1 ) guarantees such a voting equi-
librium. One limitation is that such a voting equilibrium (W0 , W 1 , P, J(l) 
may not produce only one type of consumer (i .e., consumers with different 
profit shares can win in different dimensions ),3 then unless a coalitional gov-
ernment is allowed,4 the electoral outcomes in a democratic planned economy 
are sensitive to agenda setting. Thus if every voting order is possible, then 
generically there is not a unique majority winner like the median-income 
3 0ne extreme exception is when someone is the median voter in all four dimensions. 
A somewhat general case is when the utility of the private good is the same as that of the 
public good and has a constant EMUI, then there is a unique majority winner, namely, 
the median-income voter. See Proposition 13). 
4 1£ coalitional governments are a llowed, then one equilibrium occurs when all winners 
in four dimensions form the government. There might be other equilibria when some of 
the dimensional winners form a coalition. 
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consumer in a free economy (see Example 5). 
Example 5: Assumptions in Example 1 remain the same except that (a) 
this is a planned economy in which candidates choose W 0 , Wl, P and K\ 
(b) (1 - <P) = 0.5 and '1/; = 0.2; (c) the distribution of() is as follows : 0.00, 
0.00, 0.00, 0.05, 0.15, 0.15, 0.20, 0.20, 0.25. I index consumers and types 
from lowest () to highest. For example, the voter with () = 0.05 is voter 4 and 
is a type-2 voter. 
(i) For voters 1 to 4, they use simultaneous equations (3.15), (3.16), 
(3.17) and P = F'(~(l ) (see case 4, the proof of proposition 10) . Voters 1, 2 
and 3 will propose (ltV0 , Wl, P, J(l) = (3.37842, 8.96354,0.43431, 35.41122); 
voter 4 proposes (2.93177, 7.14919,0.43483, 36.05735) . For i = 5, .. . , 9, since 
() . > 1-(1- </>).P = ! = 0 125 by Corollary 1 I have W 0 = Vl/ 1 = 0, 
' - (1-,P)N 8 . ' ' 
and /(1 can be determined by (3.11) and P can be solved by P = ~ 
Xo 
(see case 1, the proof of Proposition 10) . Voters 5 and 6 will propose 
(0, 0, 0.39739, 35.59468); voters 7 and 8 propose (0, 0, 0.39643, 35.09448); 
voter 9 proposes (0, 0, 0.39586, 34.78101). 
(ii) First, consider the case when everyone votes sincerely and the voting 
order is as follows: first vote on W 0 , W 1 (or ltV1 , W 0 ), then on P, ](1 (or ](1 , 
P). It can be verified that the first stage eliminates voters 1 to 4, stage 3 yields 
one of voters 5 and 6 as the majority winner. Next consider another voting 
order: first vote on ](1 , P (or P, !(1 ), then on W 0 , W 1 (H11 , W 0 ). Then three 
types of consumers can be the majority winners when everyone votes on /(1 
conditional on the expectation of other voters' positions in (Vl1°, HI\ P). As 
shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2, /(1 (or P) is now no longer monotone in 
(), and if all voters 1, 2 and 3 are expected to be type-1 voters, then either 
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the type-3 voters (when both of them are correctly or incorrectly expected) 
or the type-2 voter (when one of the type-3 voters is thought to be a voter 
withe= 0.01888) will be the majority winner. However, if all voters 1, 2 and 
3 are expected to be voters with e = 0.16543, then one of them will be the 
winner. Clearly the last case corresponds to the situation when extremists 




F1gure 3.2: Po11cy Instruments for Example 5 
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Tab l e 3. 1 · Poll ey Inst rumen t s !or Exampl e 5 
e wo WI K l p 
0 .00000 3 .37842 6.96354 35.41122 0.43431 
. 
0 .01888 3 .27216 8 .55640 35.59468 0 .43446 
0 .05000 2 .93177 7.14919 36.05735 0.43483 
0.12056 0 .00000 0 .00000 36.05735 0.39835 
0 . 15000 o.o·oooo 0.00000 35.59468 0 .39739 
0 . 16543 0 .00000 0.00000 35.41122 0 .39703 
0 .20000 0 .00000 0 .00000 35.09448 0 .39643 
0.25000 0 .00000 0 .00000 34.78101 0.39586 
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3.2.5 Constant Elasticity of Marginal Utility of In-
come 
As shown in Chapter 2, when utility from the private good has a constant 
EMUI, then we have t hree interesting properties. First, fiscal policy and 
income dist ribution have no effect on economic growth. Second, among dif-
ferent distribut ions of wealth, the higher the profi t share of the decisive con-
sumer (i.e., median-income consumer), the lower the tax rate. Third, when 
the median of the pre-tax income distribution is the mean, then I have pro-
vided a counter-example of the Kuznets curve. Can we get any interesting 
results in a democratic planned economy when utility of the private good 
has a constant EMUI? For instance, can we avoid agenda-dependent equi-
librium? Fortunately, when consumers are not very rich such that everyone 
prefers some non-zero wage rates , this class of utility functions completely 
solves the multi-dimensionality problem encountered in the last section. 
Proposition 13: When nobody prefers zero wage rates, and x 
and ~ have constant EMUis and x =a~+ b (a> 0), then 
(a) each consumer will propose the same !{1 and P that are 
determined independently of Oi(i = 1, .. . , N); vV/ = d(I(l )Wp, that 
is, every consurner will propose a pair of wage rates which are 
linearly proportional by a variable d which is a function of /{1 ; 
(b) the median-income consumer will become the majority win-
ner, 
(c) the democratic planned economy generates the same growth 
path as the free econmny. 
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Proof: (a) The fact that each consumer i proposes a pair of non-zero wage 
rates corresponds to case 4, the proof of Proposition 10. Therefore, equations 
(3.15) to (3.17) must be satisfied. Let us assume x(x) = ax1- c + b, where 
a, b > 0 and c < 1 (the other two cases can be similarly proved) . Then (3.17) 
can be rewritten as 
Recalling I" = ei(1 - 'lj;) + (11)"' and T = 1 - ei(1 - 'lj; )N- (1 - <P)'l/J, 
W 0 + [Oi(1 - 'lj;) + (1 ~<P )'l/;][F(f<) - I<1 - NW0 ] 
[,BF' (I< I )rl/c { wl + [Oi(1 - 'l/J) + (1 ~<P )'l/JJ 
[F(J<1)- NvV0J}. (3.23) 
Substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.17) yields 
So, I have 
Substituting (3 .24) into (3.23) yields W 0 = [,BF'(J<1)r 11cW1 . Thus for any 
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given I<1 , W 1 is linearly related to W 0 . Using the equality in (3.24), we have 
(3 .25) 
J<1 can be solved independently of 0;, so can P since P = .6F'~K1 ) in this 
case. 
(b) Part (a) shows that policy parameters among consumers differ only in 
W 0 and W 1 . Moreover because W 0 and W 1 are linearly related for the given 
J<1 , the four-dimensional voting problem is in fact only one dimensional , 
namely, a straight line in (W0 , W 1 ) space. (3.16) can be rewritten as 
Now taking total derivatives with respect to lV1 and 0; in (3.16), and recalling 
(1- ¢)1/; 
11 = 0;(1 - 1/;) + N and 
T = 1- (Ji(1 - 1/; )N- (1- ¢)1/;. 
I have 
d(W1 ' ()i) ( T 2 X~ + (pN) 2 ~~' )dW1 + 
+ { - (1 -1/J)Nx~ + T(l -1/J)[F(J<1)- I<1 ]x~} dO;= o. 
So 8~1 < 0. Similarly as the proof of Theorem 1, the median-income con-
sumer will be the majority winner. 
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(c) The proof follows by comparing (2.36) and (3.25). Q.E.D. 
The example below illustrates what Proposition 13 has shown. 
Example 6: All assumptions in Example 3 are valid except that 
u(x1,x2 ) = x 1°·5 + 0.112x2°·5 , <P = ~ ' and '1/; = 0.7. Suppose we have five 
types of consumers, that is, consumers with profit shares 0, 1/18, 1/9, 1/6 
and 2/9. Then since the largest() = 2/9 is less than 1/3, beyond which a con-
sumer will choose zero wage rates, all consumers choose nOn-zero wage rates. 
The solutions are given in Table 3.2. Compared to Example 3, Proposition 
13 is true. 
It can be verified for different distributions of () that the median voter 
always prevails. For example, if the distribution is given as: 0, 0, 1/18, 1/18, 
1/9, 1/6, 1/6, 2/9, 2/9, then the majority winner is the type-3 (() = 1/9) 
consumer. If the distribution is: 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/6, 1/6, 2/9, 2/9, 2/9, then the 
winner will be one of the type-4 ( () = 1/6) consumer. If the distribution is 
given as: 0, 0, 1/18, 1/18, 1/18, 1/6, 2/9, 2/9, 2/9, then one of the three 
type-2 voters is the majority winner. 
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Table 3.2: Polley Instruments for Example 6 
e wo WI Kl p 
2/9 0.96313 4.94857 45.54354 0.44117 
1/6 1.76971 9.09285 45.54354 0.44117 .. 
1/9 2.07330 10.65268 45.54354 0.44117 
1/18 2.21958 11.40427 45.54354 0.44117 
0.00 2.30111 11.82316 45.54354 0.44117 
3.2.6 Controlling Only Growth and Inflation 
Economic systems described by the political economy model in which the 
government controls all macroeconomic instruments no longer exist in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union, let alone the democratic planned 
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economies in Western Europe. In this subsection, I consider a more relaxed 
model in which government only controls economic growth and inflation, i.e., 
I<1 and P. All assumptions and timing remain the same except that now 
the government only controls I<1 and P, and vV0 and W 1 are determined 
by marginal productivities. 5 Can this setup, which has only two parameters 
that voters vote on, solve the generic problem of agenda-dependent political-
economic equilibrium encountered in a complete democratic planned econ-
omy (see Subsection 3.2.4)? This turns out to be true when the production 
technology is Cobb-Douglas. 
Proposition 14: In a democratic planned economy with Cobb-
Douglas production technology, when government only controls 
capital stock and inflation, then any sequential voting over (I<1 , P) 
yields the median-J<1 voter as the majority winner. 
Proof: First, suppose the production function is 
where A > 0, 0 < a, and b < 1. Similarly as before, L = N because labor 
causes no disutility for consumers. Since F(K1 ) = f(I<\ N) + (1 - 8)I<\ it 
is easy to check 
(3.26) 
5 As seen in the model of a free economy, the fact wage rates are equal to marginal 
productivities (equations (2.6) and (2.7)) results from maximization of the firm. 
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p' (J<1) - N !;'1 (J<1' N) > ~~ (!<1' N) - N !;'1 (!<1 ' N) 
Aa(1 - b)(I<1 t -1 Nb > 0. (3.27) 
Second, because the marginal utility of income A; > 0, by the Kuhn-
Tucker Theorem, (3.4) is binding. Since A; > 0 and X~ > 0, by (3 .3), 
P > 0, thus (3.5) is binding. (3.4) and (3.5) imply (3.9) and (3.10), i.e., 
cJ = W 1 + 8;(1 - 7/J )[F(J(l) - NW1 ] . Substituting (3.9) into (3.4) , I have 
c? = W 0 + 8;(1- .,P)[F(i<)- I<1 - NW0 ] . 
By the Inada condition limK-+O ft(I<, N) = + oo, I<1 > 0, thus (3.8) 
is binding. (3.2) and (3.3) are binding too because c?, cJ > 0. Letting 
H(I<1) = LHS(3.8) - RHS(3.8) = 0, J.L = (1-:l.P + 8;(1 - .,P), substituting 
(3.2) , (3.3), (3.9) and (3.10) into H(I<1 ) = 0, and t aking derivative with 
respect to /{1 , we have 
8H(I(l) 
()/{1 
J.L2X~ + f3 J.Lx~ F"(¢1/J ) 2~~ + (3¢1/J~~F" + 
+ (3[(
1
-N¢ )7/J + 8;(1- 7/J )] {!;'1 + J.L[F' - Nj;'1J} F'x~ + 
+ (3¢1/J { ¢7/J[F' - N !;'1]} p' ~~' < 0. 
The above inequality holds because of (3 .26) and (3 .27). Thus for each 
consumer i, there is a unique optimalJ(l . 
Third, (3.2) and (3.3) yield 
f3x' {f~(I(l,N) + J.L[ F(I<1)- Nf~(I<\N)J} 
p = x ' {h(I< ,N) + J.L[F(I<)- I<1 - Nf~(I<,N)J}" 
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Now taking the derivative of P with respect with ](1 in the above equality 
yields 
Therefore P is a decreasing function of /(1 . 
Fourth, as shown in part three, individual preferences are indexed by the 
parameter J(l, thus by Grandmont (1978), the median-K1 voter will beat 
any rival in the final stage (i.e., voting on P) because everyone is sincere. By 
backward induction, this median-K1 voter will defeat any opponent in stage 
1 too. Q.E.D. 
3.3 Summary and System Comparison 
Let me answer the questions raised at the beginning of the Introduction. 
First, when voting is sequential on the macroeconomic instruments, there 
exist political-economic equilibria. However, those equilibria are generally 
agenda-dependent. Thus if a coalitional government is not allowed, then cer-
tain voting procedures may cause political chaos and social instability when 
extremists take power and implement their favorable growth plans. 6 Sec-
ond, with a Cobb-Douglas production technology, decentralization of wage 
6To some extent, an authoritarian planned economy can be thought as a special case 
of a "democratic" planned economy where communist elites are agenda setters. They set 
certain voting procedures to eliminate their opponents. 
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decisions in a democratic planned economy can guarantee a unique political-
economic equilibrium and a growth path that is middle-class-oriented. Third, 
when consumers have the same constant EMUI utility functions for the pri-
vate good and the public good, the economic growth path in a democratic 
planned economy is the same as that in a free economy. The growth path is 
distributionally neutral too. 
By comparing results of a free economy with those of a democratic 
planned economy, I can reach the following three conclusions concerning the 
differences between the two economic systems: 
First, when the distribution of wealth is uniform, then regardless of eco-
nomic systems, the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition always implies a 
political-economic equilibrium. 
Second, when consumers have the same constant EMUI utility functions 
for both the private good and the public good, then the economic growth path 
is fiscally and distributionally neutral in a free economy or distributionally 
neutral in a democratic planned economy. In addition, the growth paths of 
these two systems are the same. 
Third, a political-economic equilibrium in which the median ( 0) voter 
prevails always exists in a free economy; while there are generally multiple 
equilibria which depend on the agenda setting in a democratic planned econ-
omy. In this regard, fiscal policies in a free economy are more middle-class 
oriented than those in a democratic planned economy. 
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Chapter 4 
An Empirical Study of 
Economic Growth 
4 .1 Introduction 
Many economists have examined the relationship between economic growth 
and various macroeconomic variables, such as income equality (Kuznets 
(1955), Ahluwalia (1976), Saith (1983), Lindert and Williamson (1985), Ram 
(1988) , and Persson and Tabellini (1991)), government spending (Landau 
(1983) , Kormendi and Meguire (1985) , Grier and Tullock (1987), Barth and 
Bradley (1987), and Barro (1991), (1990)), and the initial economic condi-
tions (Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Barro (1991)) . 
This chapter presents exploratory empirical evidence bearing on a set of 
hypotheses which concern the effects of economic determinants on economic 
growth. These hypotheses are derived from both neoclassical growth models 
98 
and the theoretical analysis in chapter 2 and tested across a sample of fifty-
two countries. Among the hypotheses investigated are the effects of (i) the 
initial economic conditions, (ii) the growth rate of the labor force, (iii) the 
ratio of private capital investment to GDP, (iv) the weight of public sector, 
(v) human capital, (vi) government spending, (vii) geographical regions, and 
(viii) income inequality on economic growth. 1 
My empirical study differs from other similar studies in the following 
respects: First, both private investment and public sector investment are 
included in my study. According to theoretical discussions in Chapters 2 
and 3, the weight of public sector as well as private investment may affect 
economic growth, so my setup could provide additional explanatory factors 
for economic growth. Second, I use the Gini coefficient to measure income 
inequality and study the effects of income inequality on economic growth. 2 
However, because of limitations of the World Development Report (abbrevi-
ated as WDR) data, the Gini coefficients are not available on annual bases. 
Third, I study economic growth across time and countries as well as across 
countries. Although this setup may decrease the fit of our empirical models, 
we avoid loss of efficiency of data encountered when pooling data across t ime 
(see eg., Johnston (1960)).3 
1There is much literature concerning the opposite problem, namely the effects of eco-
nomic growth on income distribution. This literature is inspired by Kuznets' inverted 
U-curve hypothesis: in the early stages of growth, inequality increases, then stabilizes and 
finally in the later stages of growth it declines. For a recent evaluation of the theoretical 
as well as empirical work on the Kuznets curve, see Lindert and Williamson (1985). 
2 Persson and Tabellini (1991) examine the same problem by using the share in personal 
income of the top 20 % of the population, INCSH, as the measurement of inequality. They 
find the correlation coefficient between the Gini-coefficient and INCSH is close to 0.8. 
3 Persson and Tabellini (1991) do consider the variation of regressions for economic 
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The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts: empirical design and 
hypotheses, results, and summary. There is also a short appendix giving 
descriptions and definitions of the variables used in the paper. 
4.2 Empirical Design, Variables, and Hy-
potheses 
4.2.1 Empirical Design 
The data for this study come from a sample of fifty-two countries from the 
World Development Report 1991: Supplementary Data. A list of countries 
under study is given in Table 4.1.4 The countries were chosen because they 
had continuous annual series for GDP per capita, total population, the ratio 
of investment to GDP (private and public), average years of education, and 
the ratio of government spending to GDP over the period from 1970 to 1986. 
growth across time. They add a set of period dummies (which cover 15 to 20 years) to 
their cross-country regressions, and find the time dummies add considerable explanatory 
power. 
4 As seen in Table 4.1, the list of countries under study does not include any European 
or North American countries besides Turkey. 
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6. Central African Rep* 
7. Chile 









17. Hong Kong 






24. South Korea 
25. Liberia* 
26. Sri Lanka 
•: Missing data of income distribution. 




























I measure secular economic growth by using the average annual rate of 
growth of GDP per capita (MGROW) . I model MGROW as a function of 
other variables drawn from the previous sample period that, according to 
various hypotheses, should affect secular economic growth. I use the following 
simple cross-sectional model: 
where MGROW/+1 is the mean growth of GDP per capita over t he 1971-
1987 period, Xf is a vector of initial economic variables, dummy variables, 
and the means of explanatory variables (such as the size of labor force, private 
capital investment , the weight of public sector, technical skill or production 
efficiency, income tax rate, and income distribution) at over the 1970-1986 
period , j3 is a coefficient vector associated with X i, and Ei is error term. 
4.2.2 Variables 
1. MGROW, the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, is the 
dependent variable in this analysis. I calculate the mean of p er capita GDP 
for fifty-two countries under study across the t ime span 1970-87 and the 
average annual growth rat e of GDP per capita across the time span 1971-87. 
5 Although pooling the sample across t ime may increase the R-square in my 
5 All other variables are calculated in the same way except that the time span is 1970-86. 
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study, it might jeopardize efficiency. So I would like to look at all data across 
time as well as across countries . Over the 1971-1987 period the mean value 
of MGROW is 1.403 %, and it ranges from -2.599% (for Liberia) to 7.242 
% (for South Korea). Summary statistics for all variables are given in Table 
4.2. 
2. GDPINI, the level of GDP per capita in 1969, represents the initial 
economic condition. MGDP is the average annual GDP per capita from 
1970 to 1986. First , I use the level of GDP per capita in 1969 instead of 
1970, in which all independent variables begin. Second, since there is a high 
correlation between GDPINI and MGDP (R2 = 0.88, SE = 0.06411, and 
t = 19.37713), I concentrate on GDPINI only. The mean of GDPINI is 
922.596, and it ranges from 103 (for Ethiopia) to 4819 (for Venezuela). 
3. POPINI is the total population in 1969, while MRPOP is the av-
erage annual growth rate of population. Since there is a high correlation 
between total population (POP4) and total labor force, interpolated (LA-
BOR4) (R2 = 0.99739, SE = 0.00282, and t = 138.339), I focus on total 
population in this study. The variable POPINI has a mean of 27,443,500, 
and it ranges from 829,000 (for Mauritius) to 547,569,000 (for India) . And 
the variable MRPOP has a mean of 2.596 (%), and it ranges from 1.380 (%) 
(for Mauritius) to 4.025 (%) (for Cote d'Ivoire) . 
4. MPRI is the average annual ratio of gross private investment to GDP 
and represents the size of investment in the private sector. MPUB, the aver-
age annual ratio of public sector investment to GDP, is used to characterize 
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the weight of public sector.6 MPRI has a mean of 13.208 (%), and it ranges 
from 2.913 (%) (for Burundi) to 31.525 (%) (for Singapore). And MPUB 
has a mean of 9.097 (%), and it ranges from 2.610 (%) (for El Salvador) to 
30.092 (%) (for Algeria) . 
5. MEDU is the mean of the estimated average years of education of 
the population of working age (15 to 64), MPERT is the average total gross 
primary enrollment rate (percent), and MSERT is the average total gross 
secondary enrollment rate (percent). Because WD R data lacks direct mea-
surements, such as the ratio of teachers to students, for technical skills, I use 
MEDU, or MPERT and MSERT, indexes of investment in human capital, as 
approximations. Since it is unclear which of MEDU, MPERT and MSERT 
better measures technical skill, I will use them as independent variables sep-
arately (MEDU in Table 4.3, and MPERT and MSERT in Table 4.5). My 
conjecture is that among MEDU, MPERT and MSERT, MSERT, the av-
erage total gross secondary enrollment should be the best measurement for 
quality as well as quantity of education. MEDU has a mean of 4.154, and it 
ranges from 0.415 (for Burkina Faso) to 8.613 (for Sri Lanka). MPERT has 
a mean of 83.480, and it ranges from 17.875 (for Mauritius) to 130.000 (for 
6 MDR points out, for developing countries, private sector investment data is usually 
not compiled as part of national accounts. It must be determined as the residual between 
a measure of tota l investment for an economy and that of the consolidated public sector. 
Thus, INVGPR4 and INVPUB4 add up to total domestic investment as a share of GDP. 
The public sector investment is defined as capital expenditure of the consolidated general 
government plus that of public corporate entities. The assumption was made that a ll 
inventories (stocks) were held in the private sector. The often "spotty" nature - both 
in definition and in availability - of existing time series data on public sector capital 
expenditure for these countries leads to a chance of potentially significant error in the 
estimates. 
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Congo). And MSERT has a mean of 24.092, and it ranges from 1.750 (for 
Rwanda) to 59.500 (for Congo) . 
6. MGCON is the average annual share of government consumption in 
GDP (GCONX2) and serves an our measure of government spending. Since 
WDR does not measure income tax rate directly, I use MGCON as the ap-
proximation of income tax rate in the paper. The mean value of MGCON 
is 14.269 (%), and it ranges from 7.189 (%) (for Hong Kong) to 36.494 (%) 
(for Israel). 
7. AFRICA is the dummy variable for Africa, and LATAMER is the 
dummy variable for Latin America. Among my sample of 52 countries, there 
are 26 African nations, 13 Latin American nations, and 13 other nations 
(which include 12 Asian nations and 1 European nation) . 
8. GINI, the Gini coefficient, is the ratio of the area between the cumula-
tive percentage share of household income and the equality line ( 45-degree-
line) to the area under the equality line in Figure 4.1. It measures income 
inequality. The higher the Gini coefficient, the less equalized the income 
distribution. Since WDR data provides the percentage share of household 
income for five quintile groups of households and the top 10 % households, 
the Gini coefficient can be calculated according to the following formula. 
GINI = 1- 0.001[18 * q1 + 14 * q2 + 10 * q3 + 6 * q4 + 3 * q5- 2 * q6], 
where q1, q2, q3, q4, q5 and q6 are the percentage shares of household income 
by the lowest 20 percent of households, the second quintile household, the 
third quintile household, the fourth quintile household, the highest 20 percent 
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of household and the highest 10 percent of households respectively (see the 
Appendix) . GINI has a mean of 0.442, and it ranges from 0.282 (for Morocco) 
to 0.582 (for Brazil).7 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
(Cross-Country) 
VARIABLES #OBS MEAN STD.DEV MIN MAX 
MGROW 52 0.01403 0.02261 -0.02599 0.07242 
GDPINI 52 922.596 928.677 103.000 4819.00 
POPINI 52 2.74*10 7 7.73*10 7 8.29*10 5 5.48*10 8 
MRPOP 52 0.02596 0.00617 0.01380 0.04025 
MPRI 52 0.13208 0.05168 0.02913 0.31525 
MPUB 52 0.09097 0.04278 0.02610 0.30092 
MEDU 52 4.15385 2.12669 0.41500 8.61294 
MPERT 51 83.4799 28.2998 17.8750 130.000 
MSERT 51 24.0915 16.2823 1.75000 59.5000 
MGCON 52 0.14269 0.05353 0.07189 0.36494 
GINI 33 0.44226 0.07092 0.28180 0.58190 
70ne interesting scenario is tha t as GDP grows, GINI increases first and then decreases, 
since 
GINI = 0.37756 + 9.5510-5 MGDP- 1.8710-8 MGDP2 , 
and the t-values for MGDP and MGDP2 are 3.34314 and - 3.56335, R 2 = 0.29918, and 
SE = 0.06132. 
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The regression equation is expressed as: 
MGROW a+ f31GDPINI + f3zPOPINI + f33MRPOP + f34MPRI 
+ f35 MPUB + f36MEDU + f31MGCON + f3aAFRI CA 
+ f39 LAT AM ER + f310GI N I+ t:. ( 4.1) 
Remark: Since there are only 33 countries which have at least one data 
of the percentage share of household income for five quintile groups of house-
holds and the top 10 % household and those datum are not collected on 
annual bases, any results in my paper concerning income distribution are 
very preliminary. 
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q1, q2, q3, q4, qS and q6: Percentage sbare of household income by 
the lowest 20%, the second quintile, the third quintile, the fourth 
quintlle, the highest 20% and the highest 10% of households 
respectively. 
. Shaded Area 
Gini Coefficaent = ···-···--····· Area (OAB) 
Figure 4.1: Gini Coefficient. 
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4.2.3 Hypotheses 
I focus on the following hypotheses concerning the effects of economic deter-
minants on growth. These hypotheses are derived from either neoclassical 
growth theory or the theoretical analyses in Chapter 2. 
(i) Hypothesis concerning the effects of initial economic conditions. 
In neo-classical growth models with diminishing returns to capital , a coun-
try's per capita growth rate tends to be inversely related to its initial level 
of income per person (Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965)) . 
This convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with cross-country ev-
idence, which indicates that per capita growth rates for about 100 countries 
in the post-World War II period are uncorrelated with the starting level 
of per capita product (Barro (1991)). However, Barro shows if one holds 
constant measures of initial human capital - measured by primary and sec-
ondary school-enrollment rates - there is evidence that countries with lower 
per capita product tend to grow faster (see also Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1990)). 
(ii) Hypothesis concerning the effects of the growth rate of labor force. 
Under standard neoclassical growth theory, the steady state growth rate 
should equal the growth rate of the labor force plus the growth rate of ex-
ogenous technological change, implying a positive relation between the mean 
population growth rate and the mean annual economic growth. Kormendi 
and Meguire (1985) find a significantly positive effect of the mean popula-
tion growth rate on the mean annual rate of growth of aggregate real gross 
domestic or national product. Since I examine the growth rate of GDP per 
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capita instead of the growth rate of real GDP, it is less obvious whether the 
positive relation should still hold. 
(iii) Hypothesis concerning the effects of the ratio of private investment 
to GDP. 
Neoclassical growth theory predicts a positive relation between the steady 
state growth rate and the growth rate of exogenous technological change. 
Since, generally speaking the growth rate of exogenous technological change 
is positively related to the size of private investment, I expect a positive 
relation between the mean ratio of gross private investment to GDP and the 
mean annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
(iv) Hypothesis concerning the effects of the weight of the public sector. 
There is no existing neoclassical growth theory regarding the effects of 
the weight of public sector. My theory does not predict a definite relation 
between the weight of public sector and economic growth, since the weight 
of public sector could be an endogenous variable which is determined by the 
distribution of income (see Subsection 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).8 
(v) Hypothesis concerning the effects of the quantity of human capital 
per person. 
Neoclassical growth models point out that increases in the quantity of 
human capital per person tend to lead to high rates of investment in human 
and physical capital, and hence, to higher per capita growth (Becker and 
Murphy (1990)) (See also Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991)) . Barra (1991) 
8 Example lv 
in Chapter 2 does show that when the weight of the public sector increases, economic 
growth rate also increases. However this result relies on some critical assumptions, such 
as the substitution rate of public good and private good is 1, and the discount rate is 1. 
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demonstrates that given the level of initial per capita GDP, the growth rate 
is substantially positively related to the starting amount of human capital. 
(vi) Hypothesis concerning the effects of government spending. 
"Supply side" theories hypothesize that the taxes necessary to support 
government spending distort incentives, generally reduce efficient resource 
allocation, and hence reduce the level of output. This prediction has its 
empirical support from Landau (1983), Grier and Tullock (1987) and Barro 
( 1991). However, Kormendi and Meguire ( 1985) do find an insignificantly 
positive effect of the growth of government spending as a proportion of output 
on growth. Barth and Bradley (1987) also show an insignificantly positive 
effect of the share of government investment in GDP on growth. 
(vii) Hypothesis concerning geographical regions. 
As known in Chapter 2, different economic growth patterns may result 
from different forms of utility functions, which may be due to different cul-
tures, customs and geographical regions. Since there are no other variables 
in WDR data that measure cultures and customs, AFRICA and LATAMER 
are included to capture some of the difference. I do not have any theoretical 
prediction concerning the effects of geographical regions on economic growth. 
However, Barro (1991) finds significantly negative coefficients on these two 
dummies. 
(viii) Hypothesis concerning income inequality. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the distribution of income can indirectly af-
fect economic growth by deciding a fiscal policy through political election. 
However, the direction of effect is not determined by my model. Persson and 
Tabellini (1991) demonstrate that income inequality is harmful for economic 
111 
growth, because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do 
not allow full private appropriation of returns from investment. They also 
find statistically strong support for the negative effect of income inequal-
ity on economic growth (see also Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , and 
Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990)). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Results 
The cross-section regression results are presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.5. Tables 
4.3 and 4.5 report the results of estimating cross-section regressions in the 
form of ( 4.1) when the Gini coefficient is excluded, where the independent 
variables are discussed in the last subsection. The difference between Tables 
4.3 and 4.5 is that the variable (variables) rela ting to human capital is MEDU 
in Table 4.3, and are MPERT and MSERT in Table 4.5. 
The result of the estimating cross-sectional regression in the form of ( 4.1) 
is given in Regression 1, Table 4.3. The regression as a whole explains around 
52 percent of the variation in measured economic growth. T he estimated co-
efficient on GDPINI is negative as expected from neoclassical growth theory, 
and thus the convergence hypothesis seems to lack empirical support. How-
ever, this negative relation is not as strong as those of Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985), and Barro (1991). Since a one percent increase in initial GDP per 
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capital is associated with 0.0055 to 0.0092 percent decrease in the growth 
rate of GDP per capita in their reports, the negative effect here is almost 
negligible. Thus there is no strong indication of convergence in growth rates 
in my study. I believe that difference in samples may have caused the differ-
ence of explanatory power of GDPINI on MGROW between my study and 
their. The WDR data covers either developing countries or those fast growing 
developed countries, such as Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong. Adding many 
maturely developed countries, which should be more likely to have achieved 
the full capacity of growth, may intensify the negative effect of GDPINI on 
MGROW. 
I find that the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita is negatively, 
although not significantly, related to the initial population and the average 
growth rate of population. A one percent increase in the growth rate of the 
population is associated with a 0.85465 percent decrease in the annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita. This finding suggests that if we examine the mean 
annual rate of growth of GDP per capita instead of the mean annual rate of 
growth of aggregate gross domestic products, then the effect of population 
growth changes sign. 
The coefficient on MPRI is positive and significant as expected. A one 
percent increase in the annual ratio of gross private investment to GDP is 
associated with a 0.17197 percent increase in the annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita. Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea have the three highest 
values for the annual ratio of gross private investment to GDP, which raised 
the estimated growth rates by 5.42% for Singapore, 4.03% for Hong Kong, 
and 3.97% for South Korea. This strongly positive relation between the 
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annual ratio of gross private investment to GDP and economic growth has 
been widely noted. It is commonly known that Japan, West Germany and the 
four Little Dragons (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) 
have relatively high savings rates which enable them to use a big part of 
GDP in private investment. We therefore accept the hypothesis that private 
investment has a strong positive effect on economic growth. 
A positive although not significant effect of MPUB is found on economic 
growth. A one percent increase in the ratio of public sector investment to 
GDP is associated with a 0.07949 increase in the annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita. 
The negative coefficient on MEDU is contrary to expectations, although 
it is insignificant and quite small.9 My first conjecture is that the estimated 
average years of education of the population of the working age group (15 
to 64) does not fully measure the quality of education of the labor force. 
For example, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Malaysia, Philippines and Maurituis rank 
the top five, while Hong Kong ranks number 20 in MEDU among 52 coun-
tries under study. This quite contradicts with the common belief that Hong 
Kong, Singapore and South Korea all have very high quality labor forces. I 
will consider the other measurements of education, namely the average to-
tal gross primary enrollment rate (percent), MPERT, and the average total 
gross secondary enrollment rate (percent), MSERT in Table 4.5. 
As expected from neoclassical growth theory, the estimated coefficient 
on MGCON is negative although insignificant. A one percent increase in 
9 As Persson and Tabellini (1991) show, SCHOOL, an index for average skills, has the 
positive effect on economic growth, but is never statistically significant. 
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the average annual share of government consumption in GDP is associated 
with a 0.05796 percent decrease in the average annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita. This is consistent with the results of Landau (1983), Grier and 
Tullock (1987), and Barro (1991). 1° Kormendi and Meguire (1985) find an 
insignificantly positive effect of government spending on economic growth. 
With regard to geographical dummy variables, I find both the estimated 
coefficients on AFRICA and LATAMER are significantly negative. An 
African country and a Latin American country would be associated with 
a 0.02042 and 0.02475 percent decrease in the annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita respectively. This finding is consistent with that of Barro (1991). 
10Barro (1991) measures government consumption by subtracting estimates of the ratio 
of nominal government spending on education and defense to nominal GDP from the 
Summer-Reston (1988) figures on the ratio of real government consumption purchases to 
real GDP. He argues that expenditures on educa tion and defense are more like public 
investment than public consumption; in particular, these expenditures are likely to affect 
private-sector productivity or property rights, which matter for private investment. 
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Table 4.3: ReJ:re:.:ll2iQn~ fQr MGROW 
(Cross-Country-I) 
(1) (2) (3} (4) 
no. obs. 52 52 33 33 
const. 0.03582 0.03242 0.04163 0.03158 
(1.85162) (2.16920) (1.64890) (1.40274) 




POP INI -2.41•10 
(-0.67562) (..0.85198) 
MRPOP -0.85465@ -0.83504@ -1.97085# -2.15240# 
(·1.84621) (-1.93144) (-3.31589) (-3.80941) 
MPRI 0.17197# 0.14162# 0.20417# 0.20418# 
(2.84709) (2.73878) (3.17055) (3.83648) 
MPUB 0.07949 ..0.08340 
(1.28435) (-0.86755) 
-4 -3 -3 
MEDU -5.02*10 -4.79*10 # -5.11*10 # 
(..0.29490) (·2.24999) (·2.59047) 
MGCON -0.05796 -0.02945 
(-1.14388) (-0.56202) 
GINI 0.11617# 0.11777# 
(2.62578) (2.85664) 
AFRICA -0.02042# ..0.01804# ..0.01587@ -0.01484# 
(-2.38148) (-2.69946) (-1.90470) (-2.12640) 
LA TAMER ..0.02475# ..0.02560# -0.03197# -0.03137# 
(-3.27087) (-3.74807) (-4.20870) (-4.87569) 
R2 0.52241 0.48240 0.76207 0.72383 
SER 0.01722 0.01694 0.01327 0.01315 











Table 4.4 Marginal Contribution to R
2 
(Cross-Country) 









LA TAMER 12.166% 
TOTAL 36.215% 
Note: marginal contribution to R
2 is defined as tbe difference between tbe If 
from Regression 1 in Table 4.3 and the If from estimating Regression 1 with each 
variable deleted in turn. Tbe "total" R
2 
of0.36215 is below O.Sl241, the R
2 
in Reg. 
1 because of some intercorrelation among the regressors. 
Table 4.4 giVes the marginal contribution to R 2 in Regression 1. As 
seen, MPRI, AFRICA and LATAMER explain 27.834 (%)out of 36.215 (%), 
the total marginal contribution to R2 across all 9 variables. Then I regress 
MGROW against MPRI, AFRICA and LATAMER, and report the result in 
Column 2, Table 4.3. As seen, these three variables explain 48.636 percent of 
the variation in measured economic growth (89.398 %of 54.404 %explained 
by Regression 1 )! Thus the mean annual ratio of gross private investment to 
GDP and geographical dummies are extremely critical in explaining cross-
117 
section economic growth. 
Regression 3 provides similar results to regression 1 except now the Gini 
coefficient is included in the explanatory vector, thus only 33 out of the 
52 countries are available now. The regression as a whole explains around 
76 percent of the variation in m easured economic growth. In sharp con-
trast with conventional belief, the coefficient of GINI has a significantly pos-
itive sign. A one percent increase in GINI is associated with a 0.11617 per-
cent increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. I then regress 
MGROW on only GINI, but find a negative, although insignificantly, corre-
lation between MGROW and GINI (MGROW = 0.04021- 0.04517GINI, 
with R 2 = 0.02016, SE = 0.02269, and t = -0. 79869). Thus controlling 
other variables makes the sign of the coefficient of GINI change from negative 
to positive.11 Except MPUB, all other coefficients affect economic growth in 
the same direction they do in Regression 1. Moreover, the negative effect of 
MEDU on MGROW becomes significant. 
Based on Regression 3, Regression 4 examines MGROW by only those 
variables that have significant effects on MGROW (i .e., MRPOP, MPRI, 
MEDU, GINI, AFRICA and LATAMER) and explains around 72 percent of 
the variation in measured economic growth. 
The second set of cross-sectional regressions m Table 4.5 contains the 
same set of variables discussed in Table 4.3 with the exception of the variable 
11 It is unclear whether this positive relation results from the spotty data of GINI or 
the fact that my sample covers primarily non-democratic developing countries. Those 
countries may not face the same "growth trap" as Western developed countries when 
income inequality is large or becomes so profound that it discourages further accumulation 
and growth, see Persson and Tabellini (1991). 
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concerning human capital. Regression 5 uses MPERT and MSERT instead of 
MED U and explains around 54 percent of the variation in measured economic 
growth. All estimated coefficients in Regression 5 have the same signs and 
levels of significance as those of Regression 1 except that first, MPERT and 
MSERT have positive although insignificant effects on MGROW; second, the 
effect of AFRICA on MGROW is no longer significant. 
Regression 6 includes those variables with high t-statistics in Regression 
5, namely MPRI, MSERT, AFRICA and LATAMER and explains 49 percent 
of the variation in measured economic growth . Now we see a significantly (at 
0.05 level, one-tail) positive effect of MSERT on MGROW and a significantly 
negative effect of AFRICA on MGROW. 
Regression 7 includes GIN! and explains around 72 percent of the varia-
tion in measured economic growth. As in Regression 3, GIN! affects economic 
growth positively, although insignificantly. All estimated coefficients have the 
same signs and levels of significance as those of Regression 5 except that the 
effects of MPUB and MPERT become negative, although insignificanly. 
Regression 8 includes only MPRI, MSERT, MGCON, GIN! and 
LATAMER as explanatory variables, and explains 65 percent of the vari-
ation in measured economic growth. As seen, MPRI and MSERT have sig-
nificantly positive effects on MGROW, while MGCON and LATAMER have 
significantly negative effects on MGROW. 
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Tabl~ 4aS; R~2r~sshms f2r MGROW 
(Cross-Country-IT) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
no. obs. 51 51 32 32 
con st. 0.02674 0.00652 0.01362 -0.00352 
(1.45572) (0.64142) (0.48312) (-0.16067) 
GDPINI -4.53*1()6 -3.S7•1o"' 
(-1.07885) (-0.81093) 
POP INI -1.ss•1o·11 -1.s2•1o·12 
(-0.54482) (-0.23696) 
MRPOP -0.59691 -0.87137 
(-1.23388) (-1.23959) 
MPRI 0.13370# 0.10559@ 0.17732# 0.15145# 
(2.02512) (1.74115) (2.18763) (2.25545) 







MSERT 3.33*1tr 3.72•1a4@ 2.60*10"' 4.43*10
4
# 
(1.13355) (1.75259) (0.76841) (2.08102) 
MGCON -0.09243 -0.11304 -0.15867# 
(-1.33458) (-0.97271) (-2.24786) 
GINI 0.08626 0.04018 
(1.47095) (0.94382) 
AFRICA -0.01369 -0.01774# -0.00449 
(-1.62768) (-2.47854) (-0.40441) 
LA TAMER -0.02066# -0.02513# -0.02343# -0.02211# 
(-2.33198) (-3.58993) (-2.18148) (-3.63142) 
Rl 0.54404 0.48636 0.71894 0.64858 
SER 0.01720 0.01703 0.01512 0.01483 
Note: OLS regressions; t-values in brackets; # & @: Significant at 0.025 & 0.051evel resp. 
120 
4.3.2 Cross-Sectional and Cross-Time Results 
As argued before, aggregation of data across time may increase R2 , while de-
creasing the efficiency of the regression (i.e., lower t-values). In this part of 
Chapter 4, I examine economic growth across both countries and time. The 
variables are quite similar to those in last subsection except that first, there 
are not variables concerning initial conditions, such as GDPINI and POPINI; 
second, I do not consider GINI since the data is too spotty. Summary statis-
tics are given in Table 4.6 (for definitions of all variables, see Appendix). The 
regressional equation can be written as 
MGROW a+ (31RPOP + fJ2 IV P RI + (33JV PUB+ (34EDU + 
+ (35GCON + (36AFRI CA+ fJ1LATAMER + c. (4.2) 
Next, I report the results of estimating cross-sectional and cross-time 
regressions in the form of (4.3). Regression 9 uses EDU as the index of 
human capital, and has 860 observations. Regression 10 uses PERT and 
SERT instead, and has 808 observations. Regression 11 examines GROW 
excluding both RPOP and education variables. Compared to the results of 
the cross-sectional regressions in Tables 4.3 and 4.5, as expected, the results 
of estimating cross-section and cross-time regressions in Table 4. 7 reduce 
their explanatory power, while increasing the levels of significance of their 
estimated coefficients. Regressions 9, 10 and 11 have very similar patterns. 
First , they explain around only 11.3 to 11.5 percent of the variation in mea-
sured economic growth. Second, the higher the growth rate of the population, 
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the lower the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. This negative effect is 
statistically significant now. Third, the annual ratio of gross private invest-
ment to GDP has a significantly positive effect on the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita. Fourth, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita is signif-
icantly negatively related to the annual share of government consumption in 
GDP. Fifth, both dummies AFRICA and LATAMER significantly negatively 
affect GROW. 
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics 
(Cross-Country, Cross-Time) 
VARIABLES #OBS MEAN STD.DEV MIN MAX 
GROW 860 0.01421 0.04997 -0.15504 0.22354 
RPOP 860 0.02605 0.00721 0.00510 0.08310 
IVPRI 860 0.13320 0.06491 0.00510 0.37080 
IVPUB 860 0.09079 0.05268 0.00870 0.41320 
EDU 860 4.25235 2.20064 0.21000 10.1000 
PERT 808 82.9167 29.0885 12.0000 143.100 
SERT 808 22.7797 16.2361 1.00000 77.0000 
GCON 860 0.14189 0.05917 0.04800 0.50990 
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Signs of effects for most of the variables remain unchanged between cross-
sectional, cross time and cross-sectional regressions. The coefficients of vari-
ables in ( 9) remain the same as those in ( 1), and most of the coefficients in 
(10) have the same signs as those in (5) except PERT. 
I also presents the marginal contribution to R2 for all explanatory vari-
ables in Table 4.8. In fact, when regressing GROW against IVPRI only, I 
have R2 = 0.06416 with t = 7.66935 and SE = 0.04837. While all inde-
pendent variables explain 11.523 % of economic growth, the annual ratio of 
gross private investment to GDP itself explains 6.416 % of economic growth 
for cross-country and cross-time regressions. 
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Table 4.7: R~~r~:J:JiQn:J fQr GROW 
(Cross-Country and Cross-Time) 
(9) (10) (11) 
no. obs. 860 808 860 
con st. 0.03797 0.03917 0.03082 
(3.62990) (3.48586) (3.54367) 
RPOP -0.48009@ -0.59428# -0.39746 
(·1.90991) (-2.17042) (-1.63333) 
IVPRI 0.15616# 0.13267# 0.14885# 
(5.76780) (4.56339) (5.61482) 










GCON -0.06963# -0.06861@ .0.07294# 
(-2.45996) (·1.80394) . (-2.61283) 
AFRICA -0.02202# -0.01884# .0.01876# 
(-4.40669) (-3.56065) (-4.28138) 
LA TAMER .0.02603# .0.02710# -0.02584# 
(-5.65836) (-5.45402) (-5.64317) 
R2 0.11523 0.11365 0.11332 
SER 0.04719 0.04693 0.04719 
Note: OLS regressions; t-values in brackets; # & @: Significant at 0.025 & 0.05 level. 
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Note: marginal contribution to R1 is defined as the difference between the ~ 
from Regression 9 in Table 4.7 and tbe If from estimating Regr~ion 9 with each 
variable deleted in turn. The "total" r( ofO.lOOOO is below 0.11523, the R1 in Reg. 
9 because of some intercorrelation among the regressors. 
4.4 Summary 
We are now in a better posit ion to address the questions posed in Section 1.1. 
F irst, t here is no strong indication of convergence in growth rates. Second, 
cross-country regressions show that larger init ial population level is associ-
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ated with lower growth rate of the economy, although these negat ive effects 
are frequently statistically insignificant. Third, there is a strong negative 
correlation between the growth rates of population and GDP per capita. 
Fourth, the ratio of gross private investment to GDP has a strong posi-
tive effect on economic growth . Fifth, the ratio of public sector investment 
generally has an insignificant effect on economic growth. Sixth, the effect 
of education on growth is mixed and needs fur ther exploration. Seventh , 
government spending has a negative effect on economic growth. This nega-
tive effect is significant across countries and time. Eighth, although income 
inequality negatively, not significantly, affects economic growth, my study 
shows that income inequali ty actually enhances economic growth, not al-
ways significantly, after controlling other variables for those non-democratic 
countries in the sample. Lastly, geographical variables explain a large part 
of economic growth. Specifically, African and Latin American countries ex-
perienced much lower economic growth during the period 1971-1987. 
4.5 Data Appendix 
4.5.1 Descriptions of Data Used 
The variables used in Chapter 4 are listed below. They are generally annual 
time-series ordered by country and year (see World Development R eport 1991: 
Supplementary Data). Asterisk (*) denotes a variable reported in five-year 
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intervals. For each senes, the maximum possible time coverage and the 
number of countries with at least one observation are included in parentheses. 
1. GDPKD: GDP at constant 1980 prices, U.S. dollars. (1960-89: 86) 
2. POP4: Total population. (1960-89: 91) 
3. GDPCAP4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
GDPKD/POP4. (1960-87: 58) 
4. INVGPR4: Ratio of gross private investment to GDP. (1970-88: 94) 
5. INVPUB4: Ratio of public sector investment to GDP. (1970-88: 98) 
6. EDT: estimated average years of education of the population of work-
ing age group (15 to 64). Based on UNESCO data on enrollment rates for 
the period 1960-88, and on mortality and birth statistics. (1960-86: 68) 
7. PERT3*: Gross primary enrollment rate, total (percent). (1960-85: 
91) 
8. SERT3*: Gross secondary enrollment rate, total (percent). (1960-85: 
92) 
9. GCONX2: Share of Government consumption in GDP. (1960-89: 85) 
10. YDISTN: Income distribution, which is in terms of percentage share 
of household income, by percentile groups of households, is not included in 
the World Development Report data set. I enter the data according to tables 
"Income Distribution" in World Development Rep01·t (1980-91) . 
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4.5.2 Definitions of Variables 
Since most of our variables discussed above cover the period 1970-86 (there 
is missing data occasionally), we focus our empirical analysis on this 17-year 
span. 52 countries under study are listed in Table 4.1. All means are cross 
time. 
MGDP = Mean(GDPCAP4). 
GROW = GDPCAP4/GDPCAP4[-1] - 1. 
MGROW = Mean(GROW). 
GDPINI = GDPCAP4 in 1969. 
POP= POP4. 
RPOP = POP4/POP4[-1] - 1. 
MRPOP = Mean(RPOP). 
POPINI = POP4 in 1969. 
IVPRI = INVGRI4. 
MPRI = Mean(INVGRI4). 
IVPUB = INVPUB4. 
MPUB = Mean(INVPUB4) . 
EDU = EDT. 
MEDT = Mean(EDT) . 
PERT = PERT3. 
MPERT = Mean(PERT3). 
SERT = SERT3. 
MSERT = Mean(SERT3). 
GCON = GCONX2. 
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MGCON = Mean(GCONX2). 
GINI, the Gini coefficient = 1-0.001[18 * q1 + 14 * q2 + 10 * q3 + 6 * q4 + 
3 * q5- 2 * q6] (mathematical account is given in next part), where q1, q2, 
q3, q4, q5 and q6 are the percentage share of household income by the lowest 
20 percent of households, the second quintile household, the third quintile 
household, the fourth quintile household, the highest 20 percent of household 
and the highest 10 percent of households respectively. 
AFRICA: Dummy variable for Africa. 
Latamer: Dummy variable for Latin America. 
4.5.3 Derivation of Gini Coefficient 
As seen in Figure 4.1, the Gini coefficient is equal to the ratio of shaded 
area over Area(OAB). The shaded area equals Area(OAB) subtracts the 
area under the curve OA. Now, the area under the curve OA, A(OA), can 
be calculated as follows. 
A(OA) = 0.5 * 20 * q1 + 0.5 * 20 * [q1 + (q1 + q2)] 
+ 0.5 * 20 * [(q1 + q2) + (q1 + q2 + q3)] 
+ 0.5 * 20 * [(q1 + q2 + q3) + (q1 + q2 + q3 + q4)] 
+ 0.5 * 10 * [(q1 + q2 + q3 + q4) + (q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 + q5- q6)] 




0.5 * 10 * [18 * q1 + 14 * q2 + 10 * q3 + 6 * q4 + 3 * q5- 2 * q6]. 
A(OAB)- A(QA) 
A(OAB) 
1 __ 0._5_*_1_0_*--=['--18_ * -=-q_1 _+_1_4_*--='q=--2_+_1 0=-=--* -=-q_3 _+_6_*--'-q4_+_3_*_q=--5_- 2_*_q____.o.6] 
0.5 * 100 * 100 





The dissertation study the relationship among fiscal policies, optimal growth, 
and elections under two different economic systems: a free economy and a 
democrat ic planned economy. 
In a free economy (Chapter 2), I assume the government indirectly con-
trols the economy by selecting a fiscal policy, and a firm chooses the growth. 
First, I show that the distribution of income and the form of the utility func-
tion determine a fiscal policy (in terms of an income tax rate and a weight of 
the public sector) that, together with the utility function, decides economic 
growth. Compared to neoclassical growth models which conclude that higher 
income tax rates translate into lower rates of growth, my model takes fiscal 
policy as endogenous and provides another explanation for the widely ob-
served cross-country differences in growth rates . In other words, economic 
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growth in a specific nation may have something to do with its income dis-
tribution and the form of utility functions, which may in turn be a result 
of its culture, customs and geographic region. Therefore, to undertake a 
cross-country study of economic growth and fiscal policy without paying any 
attention to specific characteristics of a country may generate misleading and 
unreliable results. For instance, I provide examples using different income 
distributions (examples 1 and 2 in Chapter 2) to show that a higher income 
tax rate can be associated with a higher growth rate. 
Second, given the distribution of income and the weight of the public 
sector </J, when the EMUI of the private good utility function is not greater 
than one, then the wealthier are more likely to oppose a larger government. 
Given the tax rate, the wealthier are more likely to oppose a redistribution-
oriented fiscal policy (i.e., smaller¢) . I have shown that the median-income 
voter will prevail in any sequential pairwise voting over T and ¢ (regardless 
of agenda setting) under majority rule. 
Third, when a private good utility function has a constant EMUI, then 
fiscal policy and income distribution have no effects on economic growth (i.e., 
fiscal and distributional neutrality). I also find the following two interesting 
properties. One property concerns the profit share of the decisive consumer 
and the tax rate. Among different distributions of income, the higher the 
profit share of the decisive consumer (i.e., median-income consumer), the 
lower the tax rate. This conclusion confirms the statement of Meltzer and 
Richard (1981, 1983) that an increase in mean income relative to the income 
of the decisive voter increases the size of government. The other property 
is related to the Kuznets curve (the hypothesis that income inequality first 
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increases and then decreases with development) . I have shown that when the 
median of the income distribution (pre-tax) is the same as mean, then the 
tax rate is technology-proof, i.e., post-tax inequality has nothing to do with 
economic development . One interesting case is when the utility function is 
u(x,y) = A1xc+A2yc+ A3, where c E (0,1), and A~, A2 > 0 and A3 
are constants. Then, the size of government increases as the size of the 
population increases. This may provide another explanation for the growth 
of government. 
In a democratic planned economy (Chapter 3), I assume the government 
controls the economy by setting wage rates, prices and the growth rate of 
the economy. I show there exist political-economic equilibria in a democratic 
planned economy; however, these equilibria are generally agenda-dependent. 
I further show that with Cobb-Douglas production technology, decentral-
ization of wage decision in a democratic planned economy can guarantee a 
unique political-economic equilibrium and a growth path that is middle-class-
oriented. Moreover, under certain conditions, the economic growth path in 
a democratic planned economy could be the same as that in a free economy. 
In addition to theoretical work, I present an empirical study of economic 
growth (Chapter 4) and show that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the growth rates of population and GDP per capita. Private in-
vestment has a strong positive effect on economic growth. After controlling 
other variables in my sample, I find that income inequality actually enhances 
economic growth, although not always significantly. 
133 
5.2 Directions for Future Work 
This is a first attempt to bring together fiscal policies, economic growth and 
elections in order to explain economic growth more realistically and system-
atically. There are some theoretical limitations in this paper. First, through-
out the dissertation, I assume that the population is politically homogeneous 
in the sense that there are no political parties or interest groups pursuing 
their own goals. Second, I assume consumers have full information about 
all profit shares ()i and are sophisticated enough to calculate their payoffs 
through competitive equilibrium solution for any given fiscal policy. Third, I 
use the model of Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) which does not consider 
leisure in the utility function and avoids dealing with problems concerning 
labor supply and unemployment. This is certainly not realistic. 
There are quite a few directions for future research. First, can we predict 
political business cycles by introducing a cost of entry, interest groups (for 
example, a candidate has to serve for an interest group or party in order 
to get funding or win the primary) and technology shock? Second, how 
will coalitional governments change the electoral outcomes in a democratic 
planned economy? Third, if coalitional governments can somehow solve the 
agenda-dependence problem of the electoral outcome, is there any empirical 
evidence which suggests that coalitional governments are more likely to occur 
in a democratic planned economy than a free economy? Fourth, does there 
exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in a democratic planned economy when 
we request consumers to vote on W 0 , W\ P, and /(1 simultaneously (i.e., 
candidates' ideal points) instead of voting on them sequentially? 
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In addition, some of my empirical results pose a challenge for theoretical 
explanations. First, why does higher education not always lead to higher 
economic growth? Second, what are the political and economic reasons for 
the lower growth rate of the economy in Africa and Latin America? Third, 
does income inequality really jeopardize economic growth? 
Future extensions of the empirical analysis include: first, more countries, 
particularly those in Europe and North America, need to be studied in or-
der to find out whether some of my empirical findings can be generalized to 
democratic developed countries . Second, the fact that there are few planned 
economies included in the sample under study prevents me from comparing 
economic growth between free economies and planned economies, this prob-
lem can be solved when more data of planned economies becomes available. 
Third, a more systematic data set on income distribution should be included 
in the empirical study in order to obtain reliable results concerning the effects 
of income inequality on economic growth. 
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